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CONSTANT ELEMENTS OF SOVIET
INSPECTION PROPOSALS
FOR DISARMAMENT
Preface

We assume that the Soviet Union is sincerely interested in
arms limitation on an international basis, and that she, in estab
lishing such a program, accepts as necessary some system of inspec
tion.

In disarmament negotiations the Soviet Union's position has

been vague, and often inconsistent; but even in her positions of
inconsistency a pattern of emphasis does exist.

Given the initial

assumption of Soviet sincerity in disarmament negotiations, and her
apparent vagueness and inconsistency when presenting inspection pro
posals, this thesis seeks to discover if there is any pattern of
emphasis.

To locate and define this pattern of emphasis can aid

negotiators to understand what the Soviet Union demands in any in
spection system.
Establishing the Soviet pattern of emphasis does not define
what they consider essential in an inspection system,

perhaps some,

or even all, of these constant elements are merely bargaining tools
to gain what she really demands, but they indicate one area from
which disarmament negotiations can begin to build a comprehensive
inspection system.

The significance of defining a pattern of con

sistency is that it emphasizes the particulars with which the Soviet
Union has been negotiating.

iii
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A two pronged method is used to locate and define the Soviet
pattern of emphasis.

First, the nature and technical issues of

inspection are presented and examined;

and in order to discover

the Soviet interpretation and position on inspection, her inspec
tion proposals are compared to the issues of inspection.

Second,

Soviet inspection proposals since 19^6 are compared to determine
if there are patterns of emphasis;
consist of in particular.

and if there are, what they

Thus, from the Soviet interpretation

of the nature and issues of inspection, and the comparison of
Soviet proposals to one another;

we will establish the Soviet

elements of consistency in inspection negotiations.
Two assumptions are made throughout the presentation.

First,

even though the Soviet Union's stated objectives in disarmament
may be sincere, the specific elements of her inspection proposals
may not be related to what she actually requires in an inspection
system.

Second, the defining of the constant elements in Soviet

inspection proposals cannot be separated from her internal politi
cal circumstances, the international environment, available alterna
tives, or the positions of other nations in actual inspection negotia
tions .
Sources used in the study include U.S. State Department materials,
studies by the U.S. Senate Disarmament Subcommittee, monographs and
journal articles, with a heavy emphasis on the records and documents

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

of the United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, and
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission.
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I. THE NATURE OF INSPECTION

Before determining the Solviet interpretation and position
on inspection and comparing the Soviet inspection proposals to
one another, an examination of the nature and issues of inspec
tion is in order.

Specifically, in this overview, inspection

is defined in terms of its role in the contemporary world;

and

the problems of making an inspection system operable are analyzed.
Two major areas must be considered in developing a practical
inspection system.

First, inspection proposals must come to grips

with the technological labyrinth found at the heart of any inspec
tion system.

The lack of solutions in this area may mean that

any inspection system is predestined to fail.

Second, related

to this problem is one concerning the manner in which inspection
affects and is affected by the state system.

A successful inspec

tion system may require a general attitudinal change in the tradi
tional interpretation of sovereignty and the role of sovereign
state.
Finally, the question of whether a foolproof inspection sys
tem can be developed is entertained.

Throughout, inspection will

be examined within the context of "general and complete disarma
ment," since it has been the focus of disarmament negotiations
since 1959*

1
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Inspection:

Why?

A basic challenge today is whether the community of nations
can develop a stable environment for international relations be
fore the accidental or intentional holocaust of nuclear war.

It

must be recognized that in a disarmament program all states are
confronted with sacrificing their sovereignty in a most serious
area - providing national self-defense.

Since disarmament dictates

that state initiative be restricted in providing the elements of
national defense, states demand security through same other means;
and in disarmament negotiations inspection is the "other means"
for providing security.

Thus, because inspection is an encroach

ment on state sovereignty, it must be capable of providing security
both to the international community and to the individual state.
The primary obstacle to overcome in disarmament negotiations
is the inherent distrust and fear nations have for one another.
Every state demands a guarantee that at any stage of disarmament
no other state will have an advantage over it, since all states
are potential violators.

Inspection can be construed as a sub

stitute for the lack of harmony and trust in the present inter
national atmosphere, but in point of fact there is no substitute
for confidence in a nation’s integrity in disarmament matters.
Inspection, to be acceptable, must be a broad concept that can
tolerate several opposing nations seeking a common interest.
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Rather than being a substitute for trust, inspection is intended
to be a means for bringing about that environment of cooperation
and trust previously lacking.

Therefore, inspection becomes a

"vehicle for the hope that some simple bridge can be found across
the abyss of distrust inherent m

the contemporary power struggle.

Coversely, it should be obvious that some degree of confidence
and trust is necessary before an inspection system can begin to
operate.
Any step toward partial disarmament or general and complete
disarmament by international agreement can be acceptable only if
there is mutual assurance of compliance among the parties involved.
Inspection has the primary propose of assuring the necessary flow
of accurate information concerning the adherence of the parties to
the commitments of the agreement.

More precisely, inspection serves

to supplement the information gained through intelligence and in
creases the reliability of what is already known.

According to

O

Finkelstein

an international inspection agreement should, minimally,

■^Corey, Robert H., "International Inspection: From Proposals
to Realization." International Organization, XIII (Autumn 1959)>

k96.
2Finkelstein, Lawrence S., Arms Inspection. International
Conciliation, No. 5^0, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
New York, November 1962. P. 39*
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. . .ensure the availability of an ade
quate flow of information, as unambiguously
as possible, to a selected number of govern
ments which need to be assured that obliga
tions undertaken under arms agreements are
being fulfilled, that the apparatus of in
spection is functioning as it should, and
that the governments will know it,-should
either no longer be true.

The basic objective of reassurance is to disclose the in
tentions of a nation and her actions, and to uncover the capa
bilities of the evader.

It is essential to the existence of an

inspection system to communicate intentions accurately, because
discovery of a violation does not necessarily mean that a surprise
attack will inevitably follow. ^
To carry out its primary purpose of reassurance, inspection
entails two functions:

l) to help deter violations, and 2) to

detect violations that have occurred.

The function of detering

violations is only feasible so long as all parties to the agree
ment believe it is to their mutual advantage to adhere to the

•'•For a detailed explanation of the purpose of inspection
see: Falk, Richard A. and Mendlovitz, Saul H. (Eds.), The
Strategy of World Order - Disarmament and Economic Development.
Mew York: World Law Fund, 1966. Pp. 382-^03. Explanations can
also be found in: Finkelstein, op. cit., p. 18; Melman, Seymour
(Ed.), Inspection for Disarmament. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1958. P. ix; and Finkelstein, Lawrence S., "The United
Nations and Organizations for the Control of Armaments." Inter
national Organization, XVI (Winter 1962), 12. The United States
interpretation is adequately presented in: Rusk, Dean, "U.S.
Efforts to Achieve a Safeguarded Test Ban Treaty." Department
of State Bulletin, XLVIII (April 1963), **68-488.
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commitments of the agreement.

Adherence to the agreement is dir

ectly related to whether the inspection system seems to be lead
ing to a condition of greater or lesser security.

It is not the

fear of detection, but rather national self-interest that will
remain the principal inducement for compliance.

Detecting vio

lations is further complicated because it involves an avalanche
of technical problems.

Detection must include the ability to

demonstrate clearly and convincingly that violations have occur
red so that each nation can, if required, protect herself from
the advances of the violator.
The ultimate objectives of inspection are to bring stability
to the international environment, reduce the world's tensions,
and create a mutual respect and trust throughout the world.'1'
Inspection serves as the guard against disarmament violations,
and becomes the stimulus for encouraging the development of these
objectives.

Inspection:

What?

In a world that is witnessing a technological explosion, it

"^Frish, David H. (Ed.), Arms Reduction: Program and Issues.
New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, I96I. P. 14.
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is not surprising that one of the issues in disarmament negotia
tions has involved the problem of defining what will be inspected.
Of course, what is to be inspected would depend on the nature of
the disarmament agreement.

Partial disarmament measures might

provide for mere aerial surveillance or electronic checking.

A

disengagement or denuclearization agreement, for example, might
be reached with agreement on a very limited inspection system.
General and complete disarmament, on the other hand, would neces
sarily involve extensive inspection of all potential sources of
military power.

Definition of a weapon

As yet, attempts to define precisely what a weapon is have
failed.

Disarmament proceedings often divide weapons into defen

sive and offensive categories, indicating that it is the latter
that will be eliminated or reduced.

Since many weapons serve in

both capacities, defining exactly what an offensive weapon is bor
ders on the line of foolishness.

However, establishment of the de

finition of a weapon is essential to an inspection system, because
without it a nation which arms herself defensively may by another
nation's standard have broken the disarmament agreement.

The nuclear emphasis

Disarmament negotiations have also differentiated between

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

"conventional" and "nuclear" weapons, with main emphasis placed
on the elimination or reduction of nuclear weapons.

Disarmament

negotiations have focused upon instituting a program of general
and complete disarmament, and it could be misleading to place a
heavier emphasis on nuclear weapons in such a program.

Since

all nations are equally interested in protecting their sovereignty
and establishing an inspection system that provides maximum se
curity for themselves, it would seem that inspection measures
would apply to both kinds of weapons with equal emphasis.

Per

haps there is a strong inclination to eliminate those weapons that
are most destructive, and that is why disarmament negotiations have
considered nuclear weapons separately.

The assumption that elimin

ating the most destructive weapons builds stronger international
security may be erroneous since nations fight wars with whatever
weapons they have at their disposal.

On the other hand, it is the

nuclear weapons that threaten mutual annihilation and thus by their
nature give urgency to denuclearization discussions.

Weapons inspection and security

In the 1960*s a debate has arisen between the Eastern and West
ern disarmament negotiators over just which weapons must be inspect
ed to provide security for all signatories to a disarmament treaty.
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It can be contended that inspection is necessary over both wea
pons that are eliminated or reduced, and those weapons that are
kept by the individual state for security measures.

The lack of

comprehensive inspection of both weapons destroyed and retained
can seriously jeopardize the chances for maintaining a balance
between disarming nations.

Nations that are fearful that others

are producing and storing large amounts of weapons may in turn vio
late the disarmament balance to provide themselves with what they
believe to be greater security.

Thus, a disarmament program could

be destroyed because the inspection system was not comprehensive
enough to provide all states the assurance they need.
Obviously, an attitudinal change in the traditional interpre
tation of sovereignty is suggested when instituting a practical
inspection system.

The concept that any state can use any means

to provide itself with maximum security in an uncertain situation
does not adapt itself to a disarmament program.

A viable inspec

tion system must be capable of assuring states that a military bal
ance is being established so that no nation will gain a military
advantage during the disarmament process.

Objects of inspection

The complex nature of any inspection system, and its encroach
ment into vital areas of national security can easily be seen by

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without p erm ission .
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surveying the objects of inspection.

The following objects are

not intended to be an all inclusive listing, but they indicate
the wide variety of materials that will be covered even in limit
ed forms of inspection.

At least three general areas exist where

inspection can be regarded as indispensible to security.

First,

it would be necessary to inspect production facilities that are
producing, or have the capacity to produce strategic weapons.

A

minimum list would include production facilities for nuclear ma
terials, missiles, and aircraft, ships and submarines, missile de
fense systems, ground force equipment, and chemical and biological
warfare units.

Second, the exact numbers of ground forces and

equipment, missiles, aircraft, ships and submarines, and nuclear
weapons would also have to be made known to insure a balance while
disarmament took place.

Even more serious in nature would be the

necessary, unhindered inspection of military research, development,
and testing activities, which have long been the guarded secrets
of all governments.
The complexity of the inspection problem can be illustrated
by examining the problems of controlling only one element - ballis
tic missiles.

Effective control would involve minimally some com

bination, or all, of the following:

ground-based conventional radar,

ground-based high frequency radar, airborne infra-red detection,
acoustic detection, detection of fuel products, radio beacons or

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.
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transpondors on authorized vehicles, and satellite-based infra
red detection.1

The engineering projects alone to cover one

item for inspection indicate a major weakness for any inspection
)
system to overcome, and perhaps all of these instruments are ne
cessary to maintain the constant flow of information that would
give the assurance some nations might demand.

Inspection:

When?

The number of inspections required to establish compliance
is an unresolved, highly controversial issue.

It is a particular

ly difficult issue to resolve because it involves a most sensitive
area for every nation;

the abridgement of sovereignty to permit

an unrestricted "invasion" of national territory by "foreigners"
for the purpose of obtaining full information concerning the na
tion's military posture.

For the inspectorate to best provide

assurance of compliance there should probably not be a specified
number of inspections, but rather inspection teams should be al
lowed to make as many inspections as they consider necessary to
fulfill their responsibilities.

It seems the impasse may be over

come only when technology develops to reduce to a minimum the

1Bull, Hedley, The Control of the Arms Race - Disarmament and
Arms Control in the Missile Age. New York: Frederick A. Praeger,

1955.

P T I 25:------------
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necessary number of "on-site" inspections made by foreign per
sonnel.
Proposals advanced by Eastern and Western negotiators for
general and complete disarmament have been broken into three
stages, but what should take place in each stage is a matter
of debate.

As yet, no list of priorities has been established.

The issue of timing involves the questions:

Should the inspec

tion system to set up and tested before any disarmament is under
taken, or should agreement be reached on disarmament first, fol
lowed by joint establishment of an inspection system?

If the

sovereignty of the state is to be protected, it seems that agree
ment should be reached on disarmament first before any state sub
jects itself to inspection by foreign personnel.

However, to

develop the assurance states might demand during a disarmament
program, it might be necessary to establish the inspection system
first and test its operation ability.

Inspection:

By Whom?

Numerous issues are involved in the organization of an in
spection agency.

For example, should the inspection system func

tion through a reciprocal arrangement or be implemented by an in
ternational organization?

Opposing sides would probably perfer

that their own personnel inspect the other parties to the agreement.
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At the same time it seems to each nation's interest to allow im
partial, trained personnel to inspect their own national terri
tory.

If the latter, who is to select and train them?

What guide

lines can he developed to qualify an individual as an impartial in
spector?

The inspectorate should he free of national intimidation

and have something other than a national government to report to ,1
but there has been no clear definition of what relationship an
inspection agency would have to an international organization.
Should the inspectorate report violations to the United Nations?
Would the Security Council's permanent members have a veto over
action proposed against violators?

No agreement as yet exists con

cerning the degree of control an international inspection organiza
tion should exercise - i.e., the scope of its authority in relation
to national governments.

2

Also unresolved, and critical to the

effective operation of any inspection system, is the manner in which
the agency would handle violations that are discovered.

^Braziller, George (Ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament, and
National Interest. New York: Donald G. Brennan, 1961. P. 325.
2Luard, Evan, "Conventional Disarmament." World Politics,
XVI (January 196*0, 192. Luard offers a brief discussion of the
scope of any inspectorate's authority in relation to national
governments. His point is: "who will control the inspectors,"
an issue which he believes will be the primary obstacle to over
come in establishing an inspection system.
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The significant aspect of the organization of the inspectorate
is that nations are selecting the method, that will be used to
choose and train the "foreigners" that will later affront sover
eignty by inspecting those areas formerly classified from outside
observance for reasons of national security.

Such a decision is

of critical importance as the inspectorate must meet with both
the national interest of each state, and provide security to the
international community as well.

Inspection:

How?

Generally, there are three recognized techniques for carry
ing out inspection:

physical inspection, records inspection, and

nonphysical inspection.

Physical inspection is the primary tech

nique debated in negotiations because it is assumed that "on-site"
investigations are the greatest assurance of compliance with the
disarmament treaty, and the most difficult method for a state to
evade.

This method is also the most severe abridgement of sover

eignty because "foreigners" are employed in "on-site" investiga
tions of vital national areas to determine the compliance of the
inspected state.
Records inspection includes budget-expenditure inspection
and production-inventory inspection.

Although it can be effec

tive, the chances of it being misleading through improper book.1

keeping make it less desirable.

A newer technique, nonphysical
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inspection,1 has been applauded as an extremely profitable method
of discouraging violations.

It suggests the unhindered question

ing of any individual by impartial teams and the encouragement of
giving voluntary information about known or suspected violations even if against one’s own nation!

Individual states could be checked

by their own nationals who could be encouraged by several inducements
to report violations of the disarmament treaty, thus saving nations
from damage to their national egos occasioned by the presence of
"foreign" inspectors on national territory.
Actual physical inspection proposals have relied on two basic
elements:

ground inspection and aerial reconnaissance.

Both are

deemed necessary for checking personnel and production facilities
if a violation is suspected, and both abridge state sovereignty.
Nations, however, have for centuries accepted self-imposed limita
tions on their sovereignty when such agreements are considered to
fall within the scope of their national interest.

Regardless of

what types of inspection techniques are employed, they are aimed
at accomplishing three things:

identification, verification, and

response to evasion.

^rear, Jay, "A New Approach to Inspection." Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, XIX (March 1963)? 107. Equally informative
on nonphysical inspection is: Braziller, George, op. cit.,
pp. 217-332 and 3^7-36^.
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Identification and verification

In disarmament, identification is the procedure by which the
inspection agency detects violations.

The engineering problems

that can arise in one area were shimmed briefly in the example of
ballistic missile control.'*'

The inspectorate must have the author

ity and equipment to detect violations clearly so that states are
assured the inspection system is operating properly.

Verification

is infinitely more complex as it involves the synthesis of identification with the intentions of the violator.

2

The question of the

intent of a state's decision-makers concerns the issue of whether
a violation involved a planned or accidental disregard of the dis
armament treaty.

Therefore, an inspection agreement must define

specifically the methods to be applied and the procedure to be fol
lowed when a violation is suspected, with the inquiry aimed at seek
ing to disclose not only facts but the underlying objectives, if
any, which led to the violation.

Response to evasion

A serious problem is posed by trying to determine the method
for responding to an identified violation.

The response is natural

ly conditioned by the nature of the verification.

■^See P. 9, beginning:

Obstruction of

"Effective control..."

2Falk, Richard A. and Mendlovitz, Saul H., op. cit., p. k2k.
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verification itself may require response, but the main dangers lie
either in over-response or the lack of response.

The kind of re

sponses most often considered are the reactions of world opinion,
the reactions within a state, or political and military sanctions
by an international organization.

Unfortunately these responses

may be too weak to deter violations;

because the stronger the re

sponse, the less likely violations will occur.

Although an inter

national agency with the power to take effective action seems to
be the practical solution, there are serious questions as to the
scope of the inspectorate's power and the organization and control
of those who carry out response action.^
Defining the response action available to an inspection sys
tem is probably the most serious abridgement of sovereignty that
parties to a disarmament treaty must consider.

What the individ

ual state is recognizing is the authority of the agency to take
severe action, including military sanctions, under conditions that
define a violation.

That the inspectorate's responsive action may

apply in the future to the state now approving the system is of
critical concern to every signatory.

The problem is how the sys

tem can protect each individual state's sovereignty, and at the
same time provide security to the international community.

In any

disarmament program states are sacrificing their sovereignty in

-'-ibid.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

17

military affairs to a nonnational organization which in turn must
provide security for all nations.

Other issues

It seems essential that inspection teams he guaranteed free
access when entering and leaving any nation, including unhindered
travel once inside a state.

Unhindered access insures the inspec

tion system of freedom of action when entering those areas where
violations are considered to be most likely.

Without this capa

bility the inspection system cannot produce the comprehensive in
formation necessary to indicate compliance by the inspected state.
The problem is that freedom of access is a violation of individual
state sovereignty, especially when "foreign" personnel can enter
national territory at will and inspect those areas of vital nation
al concern.
Related to this is
the question of whether
such inspections.

the problem of notification which involves
or not a state should be informed about

The concept of sovereignty seems to dictate

that the state being inspected has a right to be informed of in
spections that are planned or are taking place;

but advance warn

ing of a planned inspection gives any potential violator the time
to

"cover his tracks," thus hampering the inspectorate's ability

todetect attempted or actual violations.
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Inspection:

A Foolproof System?

The very nature and issues involved in formulating a practi
cal inspection system lend a pessimistic outlook for reaching any
kind of agreement.

It can be seriously questioned whether inspec

tion is of any value, because what is demanded by states is warn
ing of a surprise attack or disarmament violation, an almost im
possible feat in today’s missile era.

Several authors1 contend

that inspection is an impossibility, and that a foolproof system
p

can never be developed.

Bull

feels that the establishment of an

inspection system may undermine military development that could rid
the world of surprise attack through the development of retaliatory
forces that are invulnerable because their whereabouts are unknown.
A critical problem of inspection is that no practical method
has been developed to enforce sanctions against a violator.

Pre

vious attempts by organizations like the League of Nations and the
United Nations have not always been successful in molding interna
tional sanctions against a state that has breached international
peace and security.

Under a disarmament program states demand the

assurance that action will be taken against a violator because they

-^See: Bull, Hedley, op. cit., P. 171; Forbes, Henry W., The
Strategy of Disarmament. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press,
1962. P. 137; Marshall, Charles Burton, "Hide and Seek: Some
Dour Thoughts on Inspection." New Republic, Vol. 1^7 (November
1962), 16; and O'Sullivan, Thomas C ., "Disadvantages of Reliable
Inspection." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, XIX (March 1963), 18.
p

Bull, loc. cit.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

19

may lack the individual capacity to provide themselves comprehen
sive security.
There is also the discouraging problem of what can be done
with that portion of the economy - industrial facilities and the
labor force - that presently shares the greatest portion of the
nuclear powers' annual budget.

Thus a disarmament program must

not only provide security for the international community, but it
is also faced with serious economic and social problems that come
with the death of a significant industry.
It must also be acknowledged that it is the violator in a
disarmament program that gains the advantage.

Those nations that

have adhered to the disarmament treaty will be behind in military
technology and equipment; and, thus, be the underdogs in bringing
the violator to account for his wayward methods.
The massive growth of technology also provides an obstacle
to developing a foolproof inspection system.

As technology in

creases it becomes easier for the individual state to develop de
ceptive methods for producing and hiding their weapons.

Since

scientific advancements are focused on providing the individual
state with security, it stands to reason that advancements for un
covering weapons that are hidden lags behind.

The technological

emphasis on hiding weapons must be turned to uncovering what is
hidden, and studies and research in this area should take place
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before an inspection system goes into effect."*"

The longer it

takes to reach a suitable inspection agreement, the less likely
it is that any inspection system can be developed to uncover those
weapons that are already hidden.
Melman

O

has concluded that, to establish an inspection system

for general and complete disarmament, the annual cost would run
$1,489 million.

Although the cost is not inconsequential, it is

a mere fraction of present day defense expenditures.

The poten

tial obstacle is in what manner the cost is to be divided among the
parties to the disarmament treaty.

Even more serious is the problem

of whether a nation will be required to pay for responsive action
taken against itself, especially if the inspectorate made an er
ror in its judgment and the action was unnecessary.
Furthermore, the nature of inspection is bound to the complex
variety of technical issues that must be solved in establishing an
inspection system.

Failure to resolve these problems can mean the

ultimate failure of any inspection system.

Another problem is that

poster, William C., "Risk and Security in the Age of Nuclear
Weapons." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 48 (January 1963),
130.
p

Benoit, Emile and Boulding, Kenneth E. (Eds.), Disarmament
and the Economy. New York: Harper and Row, 1963* P. 54. In an
article entitled "The Cost of Inspection for Disarmament,” Seymour
Melman presents a comprehensive analysis of the cost factors involved
in establishing and operating a comprehensive inspection system.
Melman is Associate Professor of Industrial and Management Engineer
ing at Columbia University, editor of Inspection for Disarmament,
and author of The Peace Race, and other publications.
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the more comprehensive the disarmament program the greater the
chances are for a violation unless the inspection system is
equally comprehensive.

Bull1 has stated the problem in this

manner:
...In a general and comprehensive sys
tem of disarmament, the multiplicity of
objects and techniques of inspection rein
force one another, so as to increase the
strength of controls in each particular
department. If there is inspection of the
whole field of military activity, if mili
tary expenditure, research, the manufac
ture of armaments, the training of troops,
storehouses, all types of weapons and
forces are controlled, then the number of
points at which an attempt at evasion
might be apprehended is to that extent in
creased, and the risks of evasion multi
plied.

Again it is emphasized that each of the above named technical ar
eas is a significant encroachment on the individual state's
sovereignty in providing national security, and the very con
cept of inspection suggests the need for a revision of the tra
ditional interpretation of sovereignty and the role of the state.
Finally, it must be remarked that no disarmament or inspec
tion system can be regarded as foolproof unless all nations of
the world are involved in the conception.

As long as any nation

refuses to participate or is not invited to participate, inspec
tion becomes meaningless.

%ull, Hedley, op. cit., p. ikO.
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The Disarmament-Inspection Bond

Although a barrage of problems and issues arise from the
very nature of inspection, negotiations continue towards an
eventual solution.

Inspection occupies a position of real signi

ficance simply because it is the sine qua non of any effective
disarmament system, and disarmament discussions themselves are
meaningless unless they include consideration of inspection pro
posals .
Since the mid-1950's both the United States and the Soviet
Union have recognized the primary position inspection occupies.
President Eisenhower,

at Geneva on July 12, 1955> expressed

the following view:
Wo sound and reliable agreement can be
made unless it is completely covered by an
inspection and reporting system adequate
to support every portion of the agreement.
The lessons of history teach us that dis
armament agreements without adequate reci
procal inspection increase the dangers of
war and do not brighten the prospects of
peace...

Marshall Bulganin,
gust

p

speaking before the Supreme Soviet on Au

1955, noted that "the President of the United States

justly remarked that each disarmament plan boils down to a

\l.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee
on Disarmament, Staff Study No. 4, Control and Reduction of Arma
ments, Technical Problems. 84th Congress, Second Session, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1956. P. 3*
2ibid.
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question of control and inspection."

Acceptance of inspection

has become a minimum condition to any disarmament system, as
secrecy and disarmament are incompatible.

Thus the critical

aspect of inspection proposals concerns whether great powers are
willing to consider seriously modifying their traditional con
ceptions of sovereignty, as related to the area of national
defense, to provide security for each nation by limiting their
authority to make and use arms.
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II. THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION
OF INSPECTION

This chapter seeks to identify the "why" of Soviet in
spection proposals and what role she feels inspection should
play in a disarmament program.

Analysis will focus upon the

interpretation and position the Soviet Union has for inspec
tion in general, by relating the Soviet proposals to the na
ture and issues of inspection presented in the previous chap
ter.

Also, Soviet inspection strategy will be related brief

ly to factors outside disarmament that seem to have a bearing
on Soviet policy at that time.
The Soviet inspection proposals and her strategy are pre
sented in three chronological phases:

Stalin's postwar rule

from 19^6 to 1953> the "partial disarmament"’ phase of 195^+ to

1958, and the "general, and complete disarmament" strategy of
1959 to present.

Finally, the present Soviet interpretation

and position on inspection will be presented and analyzed.

The Postwar Phase

The initial Soviet reaction to the American proposal for
the international control of atomic energy was to criticize
the emphasis on controlling atomic power through an inspection
system.

The Soviet Union contended that the primary action in

2k
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beginning any disarmament plan must be the prohibition of the
production and use of atomic weapons.

Once an agreement prohib

iting the use and production of atomic weapons was in effect, it
could then be followed by measures structured for observance and
control.1

Another area of dispute was the effort to eliminate

the veto in the inspection agency, and it was this issue that
finally forced Soviet rejection of the American proposal.

The

Soviet Union indicated that the elimination of the veto on ques
tions of sanctions was an affront to her national sovereignty and
that the meshing of the proposed international agency's powers
with sovereignty was impossible.

2

Early Soviet proposals
On June 19, 1946, the Soviet Union introduced a two phased
disarmament p r o p o s a l . 3

The first phase called for an international

agreement which would ban all nuclear weapons, prohibit atomic pro
duction and storage, and destroy all accumulated stocks within three

\ogee, Joseph L., Soviet Policy Towards International Control
of Atomic Energy. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1961. P. 36.
o

loc. cit., p. 45.

■3

JBechhoefer, Bernhard G ., Postwar Negotiations for Arms
Control. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1961. P. 44.
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months of the signing of the treaty.

Within a six month period

the parties were to adopt legislation that would penalize the
violators.

The second phase called for the establishment of two

subcommittees under the Security Council.

One committee would

study recommendations for exchanging scientific information,
while the other would structure an inspection and control system
for atomic energy production.

The United States rejected the

proposal because she feared the Soviet Union might use the veto
to block effective agency action, especially if the action were
against a communist state.

The Soviet Union in turn denounced

the Western interpretation of the veto and expressed the view
that it was improper to conclude that since a permanent member
can use the veto in the Security Council that it would also apply
to the inspection system.

Molotov-*- later stated that "the rule

of unanimity on the Security Council has nothing to do with the
work of the control commissions."
The Soviet Union also indicated that it preferred inclusive
negotiations on disarmament, thus combining both conventional and
atomic weapons inspection together.

The United States declared that

she preferred that atomic weapons negotiations be reserved to the

\jN, ORGA, First Session, Part II, First Committee, Sum'
mary of Meetings, 2 November - 13 December 19*+6. P. 257.
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Atomic Energy Commission and won the dispute when it was brought
to a vote.^
On July 11, 19I+7 , the Soviet Union added to her original proposal.

p

Prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons

was still the primary demand;

but once it was agreed to, it would

be followed by control inspection, inventory checks, and studies
of outputs in mining and manufacturing facilities.

Personnel for

the inspectorate would be selected on an "international basis."
In 19^9 when the Soviet Union presented her Minority Plan-^
to the Atomic Energy Commission, she clarified her procedure for
establishing an inspection system.

A set of rules would be adopt

ed as the disarmament procedure which would then be adhered to by
the voluntary action of each member state.

Again, supervision of

compliance was to be placed in an international agency operating
under the Security
conventions;

Council.

Under this plan there would be two

one would prohibit atomic weapons, and the other

■kjnited Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations - 19^6-19^-7.
New York: United Nations, 19^+7• P- 380^ 381.
2UN, AECOR, Second Year, No. 2, 12th Meeting, 11 June 19^7.
Pp. 2Q-2k.

3

United Nations, Annual Report of the Secretary General on
the Work of the Organization. New York: United Nations, 1 July
1 9 © - 30 June 19^ 9 . p T T t T
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would, establish an international control system.

Both conven

tions were to be worked, out and brought into effect simultane
ously.
Throughout the postwar phase there was little change in
these initial Soviet proposals.

The Soviet Union later indicat

ed that inspection could be on a continuous basis without inter
ference, but the declaration was vague and never clarified.

Early Soviet interpretation

The early Soviet indifference to Western disarmament pro
posals was probably due to her lack of technical information on
precisely what kind of weapon the U.S. had developed.

A funda

mental determining influence to early Soviet negotiations seems
to have been her military inferiority to the West.'*'

Her early

proposals consistently relegated inspection to a secondary posi
tion and stressed the limiting of U.S. military power by depriv
ing her of her monopoly in atomic weapons.

Thus the Soviet

Union's primary goal was to establish a military balance between
herself and the United States, rather than the control of a dis
armament program.

-^Barker, Charles A. (Ed.), Problems of World Disarmament.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963. P. 120.
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The defensive characteristic of her disarmament strategy
was further underlined by her insistence that the inspection
agency be established under the framework of the Security Coun
cil.

The idea of an international inspection agency affected

Soviet strategy in two ways.

First, the recognition of an in

ternational inspection agency with comprehensive powers meant
acceptance of the status quo and the willingness to defend it.
Second, the Soviet Union feared that submitting to an inspec
tion system would compromise and endanger her sovereignty.

The

demand for a veto indicates that the Soviet Union considered
herself in a minority position and that she feared ideological
ly opposed Western nations would use the inspection agency as
an excuse to interfere internally in Soviet affairs.

Therefore,

the Soviet Union continually asked who will control the inspectors?
Gromyko1 stated the Soviet distrust of control and inspection in
this manner:
It is easy to understand that the grant
ing of such rights to control organs would
mean a complete arbitrariness of these organs
and, first of all, of those who would be in
a position to command a majority of these
organs...The Soviet Union is aware that
there will be a majority in the control or
gan which may take one-sided decisions, a

19^7.

-klN, SCOR, Second Year, No. 22, 115th Meeting, 5 March
P. i4-53-

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

30

majority on whose benevolent attitude the
Soviet people cannot count. Therefore, the
Soviet Union, and probably not only the
Soviet Union, cannot allow that the fate of
its national economy be handed over to this
organ.

Partial Disarmament

The shift to "partial disarmament" in Soviet disarmament
strategy and proposals was the result of two things.

First,

there was the Soviet explosion of a hydrogen bomb in 1953*

By

becoming a member of the nuclear club, the Soviet Union bolster
ed her military position; and psychologically she no longer felt
in the position of the underdog.

Second, Stalin died in 1953 and

was succeeded by Malenkov and later Khruschev.

Realizing the de

structive power of the hydrogen bomb, Malenkov warned that any
was fought with nuclear weapons would mean total destruction, "not
only of capitalist societies," but all of civilization.^

Finally,

when Khrushchev assumed power, the result was to relieve military
thought, in general, from the restrictions of the Stalin era.
These two factors forced a new Soviet attitude towards disarma
ment and resulted in the introduction of a new proposal.

Soviet proposal of 1955

2

The 1955 Soviet proposal

offered disarmament in two stages.

^Bechhoefer, Bernhard G., op. cit., p. 46.
2UN Doc., DC/SC.1/26, Rev. 2, 10 May 1955.
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All nations would comply with a complete freeze of armaments and
forces in 1956, followed by weapons and troop reduction in 1957.
The reductions of weapons and troops would be drawn up by a world
conference to be held in the summer of 1956.
In 1956 the inspection agency would station observors at
large ports, railway junctions, and airports to prevent any chance
of surprise attack by one state on another.

The inspection agency

would have the authority to demand progress reports on the disarma
ment plans of each country, as well as having free access to nation
al records of military expenditures.
In the second stage the inspection agency would inspect on
a "continuous basis" all prohibited or restricted activities to
insure implementation of the convention.

Inspectors would be

stationed in each country and have unimpeded access to what the
proposal called "all objects of control."

However, the inspec

tion agency was denied any right of independent action and would
report all violations to the Security Council for action.

The Soviet interpretation changes

Although the Soviet Union was now a member of the nuclear
club, U.S. flying and bombing power still exceeded the Soviet's
capacities.

Therefore, Soviet disarmament strategy reflected her

basic military posture.

Basic Soviet strategy consisted of two
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features:

l) She felt she must he prepared to receive and sus

tain a surprise attack, at any time, and 2 ) her military organi
zation must be capable of reorganizing and responding effectively
to continue the war.

1

The 1955 Soviet proposal intended to place the Soviet Union
in a stronger position by allowing her the retention of large
numbers of conventional forces and severely limiting the superior
p

air power of the United States.

The Soviet proposal emphasizes

the defense of each nation's territory from surprise attack, while
the maintenance of conventional forces could be used to retaliate
if confronted with a violation.
Inspection in this "partial disarmament" era was no longer
rejected by the Soviet Union, but rather looked upon as a tool
to gain an advantage.

Obviously inspection was coordinated to

the Soviet military needs of the day, but she meant it to accompl
ish more.

Inspection was to be just broad enough to provide warn

ing of a surprise attack and to supervise the implementing of the

-4juard, Evan (Ed.), First Steps to Disarmament - A Hew Ap
proach to the Problems of Arms Reduction. New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1965- P. "68.
2For an explanation of the Soviet attitude towards U.S. mili
tary power see: loc. cit., p. 72; Halperin, Morton H., Contem
porary Military Strategy. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company,
1967• Pp.- 57-58; and Horelick, Arnold L. and Rush, Myron, Strategic
Power and Soviet Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1966. P. 214.
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convention to provide some security to nations in the disarmament
program.

Yet, inspection would he limited by refusing the agency

comprehensive powers or response action so that each nation’s
sovereignty was protected from outside interference.

That this

proposal can provide both these elements is dubious, because any
supranational organ with the most limited authority affects the
traditional concept of sovereignty.

However, it is at this point

that the Soviet Union embarks upon a path to develop an inspec
tion system that provides security to the international community
while simultaneously protecting the sovereignty of the individual
state and its role in the state system.

General and Complete Disarmament

The "partial disarmament" phase lasted until 1959 when it be
came apparent that there were some sharp changes taking place in
Soviet strategic thought.

The tremendous progress of the Soviet

Union in developing nuclear warhead rockets and building a longrange bomber force seemingly encouraged a new stability and sense
of security that had not existed before.

The bolstered military

position of the Soviet Union and her fear of nuclear destruction
can be seen in the following statement of Premier Khrusnchev^

YorK:

Icited in: Morray, J.P., From Yalta to Disarmament.
Monthly Review Press, 1961. P. 328.
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3*+

in October of I960:
The strength of the socialist world,
combined with the rapid breakup of the
colonial system under the impact of na
tional liberation movements, and the
development of peace movements in the
capitalist states, makes it possible to
force governments to disarm even if they
don't want to.
The Soviet Ifnion now felt her military force was equal in capa
bilities with the United States.

This new stability and equal

ity to American military power allowed the Soviet Union to trans
fer her disarmament proposals from their coordination with her
basic military needs to the higher realm of international poli
tics and the humanitarian objective of population survival.

Thus

the emphasis of Soviet disarmament proposals turned to the "gener
al and complete disarmament" of all nations.

The 1999 proposal

In September of 1959 the Soviet Union introduced into the
United Nations General Assembly her declaration for "general and
complete disarmament."

The four year disarmament plan was to be

supervised by an international control and inspection a g e n c y . T h e
extent of the inspection and control would "correspond to the stage
reached in the phased disarmament."

To insure confidence, the

\fN, GAOR, l4th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 70> Doc. A/^219,
19 September 1959* Pars. 71-76.
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powers and responsibilities of the international inspection agency
were to be expanded gradually as implementation of the proposal
took place.

Following complete disarmament, the inspection agency

would have "free access to all objects of control," and then could
establish an international aerial inspection system.

The i960 proposal

In the i960 Soviet proposal, "general and complete disarma
ment" was to take place within the framework of a United Nations
Inspection Organization.^

The inspection agency would elect a

control council consisting of the three major groups of nations "socialist," Western, and nonaligned.

The council would make all

decisions by a two-thirds majority vote on questions of substance
and by a simple majority on procedural questions, except for special
ly provided cases.

Also, permanent inspection teams would be as

signed at some installations.
The i960 proposal divided disarmament into three stages.

In

the first stage the inspection agency would verify the elimination
of nuclear delivery vehicles, the ban on nuclear manufacturing, and
the demilitarization of all launching sites.

In the second phase

the agency would inspect all atomic enterprises, destroy stockpiles,

iFor a comprehensive description and analysis see:
op. cit., p. 120.
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and have unhindered access to budgetary records.

The agency

would also supervise the destruction of chemical and bacteriolog
ical weapons, as well as the disbanding of troops.

The Control

Board would study measures and make recommendations for adopting
legislation to enforce the disarmament treaty.

In the final

stage the inspection agency would be responsible for the implemen
tation of the final disarmament measures.

Aerial inspection and

mobile ground inspection teams would be used to verify that all
parties were complying to the disarmament agreement, and mobile
inspection teams could go "to any point" to carry out their re
sponsibilities .

The present Soviet proposal

The original 1962 Soviet proposal provides for "general and
complete disarmament" in three stages over a four to five year
period .1

In the first stage the testing and placing in orbit of

any nuclear weapons is forbidden.

All parties to the disarmament

treaty would liquidate any foreign military bases they had and de
stroy all nuclear delivery systems.

The Soviet Union also included

reductions in both conventional forces and military budgets.

The

second stage proposes the abolition of all weapons of mass destruction and the prohibition of nuclear weapons production.

At this

stage there is a second reduction in conventional forces and mili-

lUN Doc. DC/203, 5 June 1962, (EHDC/2, 19 March 1962).
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tary budgets.

In the third and final stage, all forces and arma

ments would be destroyed and prohibited, except for internal pol
ice, forces necessary to maintain order within the state.

In case

of a violation of the disarmament agreement the internal police
forces would come under the command of the United Nations Security
Council.
The Soviet plan specifies that all parties "solemnly undertake
to carry out all disarmament measures from beginning to end, under
strict international control ."1

Each segment of the agreement

would be accompanied "by such control measures as are necessary
for verification of that m e a s u r e . T h e inspection agency would
operate as part of the International Disarmament Organization and
consist of a general conference representing all parties to the dis
armament treaty.

The Control Council would be representative of

"the three principal groups of States existing in the w o r l d " 3
make decisions by a two-thirds vote.

and

At all times the present

nuclear powers would be permanent members of the Control Council.

^ o c . cit., Part 1, Article 2, par. 2.

2ibid,
^loc. cit., Part 5, Article 42, par. 1.
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Inspection for general and complete disarmament

Two new elements stand out in the Soviet move for "general
and complete disarmament."

First, the Soviet Union supported

the concept that an international inspection agency should be
established before disarmament began and that the agency would
supervise the disarmament proceedings.

Second, she offered both

measures of reassurance and verification by defining the power and
authority of the inspection agency and endorsing aerial reconnais
sance.
Although the Soviet Union modified her attitude towards in
spection, whe did not change her interpretation of sovereignty.
To the Soviet Union no inspection system offers a perfect control
network; and the delay of disarmament, because of the lack of a
perfect system, is interpreted as a cloud for economic and scientific
espionage.1

She continues to stress that states will have to rely

mainly on the voluntary compliance of each nation in any disarma
ment agreement.

For the Soviet Union the main principle underly

ing inspection negotiations at all times must be "respect for the
full soverign rights of the countries on whose territorial ground
control posts and aerial photography will be established."

2

Although inspection is important in verifying that all parties
are adhering to the disarmament agreement, it is not the major area

■^American Assembly, Arms Control, Issues for the Public ♦
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. P. 171.
2UN D o c . k/hO'jQ - s/41^5, Annex 15, 5 January 1959, p. 9.
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of Soviet concern.
disarm.

What is important is that states, in fact,

The Soviet strategy seems not to be concerned with sur

viving or winning an all-out war but to rule out completely the
chances of a nuclear holocaust in terms favorable for the further
growth of the communist movement.

The Present Soviet Position
on Inspection

That the Soviet Union has accepted inspection as an integral
part of disarmament can be stated as a fact, but it must be re
marked that the Soviet interpretation of inspection makes some
critical qualifications necessary.

The Soviet Union's major con

cern in a disarmament program is the clandestine violation of the
disarmament treaty; and, for her, inspection is the method of pre
venting any such occurrence.

Acceptance of inspection in these

terms is indicated in the following statement of Andrei Gromyko1
at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in March of 1962:
The Soviet Union wishes to have the ne
cessary guarantees that.the disarmament ob
ligations that have been agreed upon will
be strictly carried out and that there are
no loopholes which will permit the clandes
tine production of aggressive armaments
once the process of general and complete
disarmament has begun. Our country does

■kjN Doc. ENDC/PV.2, 15 March 1962, p. 11.
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not intend to take anyone at his word...nor
do we expect others to take us at our word.
The Soviet Union is a firm advocate of
strict control over disarmament.

However, as recently as May of 1965 the Soviet Union still
condemned any comprehensive inspection system as an affront to
sovereignty and accused nations that supported such measures of
trying to expand their intelligence system for espionage purposes.'1'
Especially obnoxious to the Soviet Union are Western proposals
that demand unlimited or large numbers of "on-site" inspections.
The U.S.S.R. has continued to emphasize that in order to protect
a nation’s sovereignty any disarmament program must be built from
a foundation of trust and that inspection is applicable only to
the essential elements of the disarmament program.

Soviet denial

of comprehensive inspection measures was emphasized when Premier

2

Khrushchev

stated that limited inspections would be accepted by

the Soviet Union merely for the sake of reaching agreement.
It seems plausible that the Soviet Union would like to elimin
ate the burdens of the arms race, but she is not prepared to endorse
methods that could endanger or weaken the Soviet bloc or expose es
tablished communist regimes to political dangers.3

Thus, Soviet

Doc. DC/PV.87 , 2k May 1965, pp. 8-152____________ , "U.S. and U.S.S.R Exchange Views on Nuclear
Test Ban." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 48 (February 11, 1963)

202.
^Mackintosh, J.M., Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy
New York: Oxford University Press, 1963* P. 3 H *
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sovereignty and her desire for protecting the Communist bloc are
her first concerns in any disarmament program.

Comprehensive in

spection can be said to be rejected by the Soviets mainly for its
incompatibility with national sovereignty chiefly "because it re
duces political control that communist leadership could exercise
in its own t e r r i t o r y . T h e problem is that the mission of the
international inspection agency could be adverse to the goals of
the Soviet national government.
There are other reasons that must also be considered in the
Soviet rejection of a comprehensive inspection system.

First,

there is the fear that disclosure of all military facilities will
provide significant targets to a state that does develop a method
to evade the inspection system.

Second, secrecy has always been

regarded as an asset by the Soviet Union when dealing with other
nations in the state system.

The fear here is that inspection

might develop into a method of political intelligence that will
be used to interfere internally with the Soviet government.
inspection requires self-confidence for any government;

Third,

self-

confidence both in the stability of the state and in the ability
of the inspection system to provide security to the international
community.

The question here is whether the Soviet Union has yet

‘S ’alk, Richard A. and Mendlovitz, Saul H., op. cit., p. 390.
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attained this confidence and whether she can retain it after
entering a disarmament program.

Rejection of comprehensive in

spection suggests that the Soviet Union does not have the full
measure of confidence she needs.

Fourth, the exclusiveness of

party control is a tenet of Soviet theory;

and the authority of

an international agency to challenge this claim is a problem in
itself.

Fifth, the Soviet Union indicated that she feels that

she is in a minority position and that she cannot trust a powerful
international agency that is controlled by others to always make
decisions in the Soviet interest.

In overcoming this realiza

tion the Soviet Union has either refused a comprehensive inspec
tion system or demands some measures of parity to control the in
spection agency.

Finally, all governments have relied on intel

ligence systems to supply information on what other nations are
doing, and it is questionable whether an international inspection
agency can provide the same quality of information during a dis
armament program.
Obviously, each one of the above reasons for Soviet rejection
of comprehensive inspection can be considered a primary question
that all nations must consider if they are going to accept inspec
tion.

Each question forces all nations to review their interpreta

tion of sovereignty and the role their state is playing in the
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contemporary world.
The Soviet Union thus accepts inspection as a necessary
element of disarmament but insists that a comprehensive system
meant to replace the lack of trust and cooperation is not the
answer.

The Soviet Union's interpretation of inspections is

perhaps best defined by Nogee and Spanier's statement that:'1'
...No control system can substitute for
the absense of mutual trust; a reliable in
strument for the detection of violations
and enforcement of disarmament obligations
cannot eliminate reliance upon the good
faith of both parties.

lSpanier, John W. and Nogee, Joseph L . , The Politics of
Disarmament - A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. P. 28.
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III. THE CONSTANT ELEMENTS IN
SOVIET INSPECTION PROPOSALS

We now turn from the previous examination of the "why" of
Soviet inspection strategy to a determination of the constant
elements that have appeared in Soviet inspection proposals since
19^6.

The knowledge that the Soviet Union refuses to endorse the

concept of a strong, comprehensive inspection system may partially
explain the vagueness that seems to permeate her inspection pro
posals during disarmament negotiations.

However, by comparing

Soviet inspection proposals to one another, constant elements
appear that the Soviet Union has consistently introduced during
negotiations.

Therefore, it would seem that these constant ele

ments are what the Soviet Union wishes to negotiate with in order
to develop a viable inspection system that meets her requirements.
Whether these constate elements are the result of the Soviet
interpretation of disarmament or whether they represent a practical
embodiment of Soviet foreign policy is not ascertained here.

Nor

is it suggested that these constant elements reflect what the
Soviet Union actually wants included in an inspection system.

What

is stressed is that the determination of these elements represents
what the Soviet Union has been most consistent about during negotia
tions and probably reflects major areas of Soviet concern in establish
ing an inspection system.

kk
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*t5
In moving from a general analysis of Soviet inspection
strategy to defining the particulars of Soviet inspection pro
posals, several questions arise which serve as a basis for de
termining and analyzing the constant elements of Soviet inspec
tion proposals.

What, for example, should be included in inspec

tion surveillance?
out?

How frequently should inspections be carried

What should be the means through which inspection will be

carried out?

How will the inspectorate be organized, and who will

fill the role of inspector?

Questions like these reflect the heart

of the inspection controversy.

Answers to them, supplied through

an analysis of Soviet proposals during negotiations, are signifi
cant when developing an understanding of the Soviet position from
a technical as well as national point of view.

Therefore, through

a comparison of Soviet inspection proposals, we are defining the
constant elements of "what, when, how, and by whom" that the Soviet
Union has presented in disarmament negotiations since 19*4-6.

Soviet Inspection Proposals:

What?

In determining what will be inspected by Soviet inspection
proposals, three elements supersede all others s i m p l y through
repetition:

l)

a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, 2)

pro

hibition of nuclear weapons production, and 3) inspection of
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hS
disarmed elements only.

All three points receive a priority

rating of 100% on the consistency scale,-*- thus indicating what
the Soviets think should be covered by inspection surveillance.

Bans on nuclear weapons

The Soviet consistency in proposing bans on the use and
production of nuclear weapons seems to be indicative of her in
terpretation of the nature of inspection.

The Soviet Union has

professed a willingness to accept international inspection during
general and complete disarmament

p

but refuses to tolerate inspec

tion probes without corresponding reductions in armaments or
forces.

The Soviet position appears to be that, "after the accom

plishment of general and complete disarmament, control will be
come unrestricted and comprehensive because then States will no
longer have anything to hide from one a n o t h e r . "3

Therefore, a

ban on the use and production of nuclear* weapons must take place
before the disarmament program itself is enacted.

To the Soviets

a ban provides the legal foundation for developing an international

^Appendix I, p. 88.
p
cAppendixes VI and VII, pp. 96-98.
3UN Doc. DC/203, 5 June 1962 (ENDC/3, 19 March 1962), p. 8 .
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^7
system that verifies compliance of the participants and provides
punishment to violators.

The emphasis of providing a nuclear

ban first came early in 19^6 when Gromyko1 stated that:
I set myself the task of emphasizing the
extreme importance of the proposal for the
conclusion of the...convention prohibiting
the production and employment of atomic wea
pons. The conclusion of such a Convention
would constitute an important practical step
toward the fulfillment of the tasks that lie
before the Commission.

The Soviet Union seemingly indicates that acceptance of this
element would verify that participating states were sincere in
their avowal to abide to the disarmament program.

Perhaps the

demand is out of place because without a previously established
inspection system nations have no guarantee that others might not
violate such a ban when it seems in their interest to do so.
However, the Soviet Union has given this element priority
O
status in every proposal by demanding it before the inspectorate
is given the authority to verify disarmament measures.

Regardless

____________ , The Control of Atomic Energy. International
Conciliation, No. i)-23, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
New York, September 19^6. P. 376.

2See: Appendix II - Article I, para, a, p. 89 ; Appendix
III - Disarmament Convention, par. 1, p. 9 1 ; Appendix IV - Stage
II, par. b, p. 92 j Appendix V - Article I, par. 1, p. 93 ; Appendix
VI - 3rd Stage, par. 3, p. 96 ; Appendix
- Part 2, Chapter I (A)
Means of delivery, p . $8 .
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of how elaborate a disarmament program the Soviet Union has intro
duced, she has made it clear that she will accept control onlyafter the prohibition is initiated.

So adament has the Soviet

Union been on this element she has even denied that it is pos
sible to continue disarmament negotiations for developing any
"reliable system for preventing surprise attacks without a prior
ban on the use of nuclear weapons."1
Since 1962, however, the Soviet Union has indicated that
there could be an exception to this comprehensive ban.

As a se

curity measure during disarmament, nations would be allowed to
compromise the comprehensive ban...
... for an agreed and strictly limited num
ber of intercontinental missiles and anti-air
craft missiles in the ’ground-to-air' category,
to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America,
exclusively in their own territory, until the
end of the second stage.
This exception was revised in 1963 to allow the Soviet Union and
the United States to keep "limited numbers" of intercontinental
missiles "in their own territory" until the end of Stage III.
It must be remarked though that these exceptions in no way under
mine the significance the Soviet Union places on the ban.

%!! Doc.

A/4078, 5 January 1959, Annex 8, p.

2UN Doc.

A/C.1/867, 24 September 1962, p. 6.

3UN Doc.

A/pv.1208, 19 September 1963.

2.
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That the Soviet emphasis for a ban on nuclear weapons still
exists was emphasized when, in April of 1965, the U.S.S.R. called
for the convening of a conference to sign:
...an international agreement (convention)
banning the use of nuclear weapons...The con
clusion of such an agreement would lead to the
further relaxation of international tension,
would be a measure for checking the nuclear
arms race, and would be a substantial contri
bution to the consolidation of confidence in
relations among States.
Even as recently as 1966 the Soviet Union reiterated her desire
p
for a ban on nuclear weapons when Premier Kosygin declared that:
The time has come to outlaw the use of
nuclear weapons...The Soviet Union is pre
pared to assume immediately an obligation
not to be the first to use nuclear weapons,
provided that the other nuclear Powers do
likewise.
Several reasons can be surmised for the Soviet emphasis on
a nuclear ban.

First, the Soviet Union might fear that the pre

mature establishment of an inspection system might develop into
a means of political intelligence, thus creating a system of es
pionage to be used against her.^

Second, the strong emphasis .on

a nuclear ban may indicate that the Soviet Union wishes to scale

Doc. DC/213 Add.2, 28 April 1965, p. 4.
2UN Doc. ENDC/167, 3 February 1966, pp. 3-4.
3UH Doc. DC/PV.87, 24 May 1965, pp. 8-15.
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down or halt the arms race at its present rate.

It might even

be possible that the Soviet Union would prefer checking the arms
race to participating in any comprehensive disarmament program.
Finally, the Soviet Union's announced support of a comprehensive
nuclear ban may have propaganda overtones in that it encourages
the active support of the masses of the world.

Inspection of disarmed elements

The other consistent element of Soviet inspection proposals
is often designated as a dispute between "control of disarmaments
or over armaments."

Soviet representatives attack Western proposals

as "control over armaments," while labelling any powerful interna
tional inspectorate as a "legalized system of international es
pionage."1
Soviet proposals stipulate that only those armaments and
forces being reduced or eliminated by the disarmament treaty are
subject to inspection.

Retained forces and equipment fall outside

the perspective of the disarmament program and therefore come under
the jurisdiction of the individual national governments.

Soviet

reasoning against inspection of retained armaments and forces was

\fW Doc. EWDC/PV.26, 2k April 1962, p. 21.
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explained, by Gromyko

in the following manner:

The contentions, sometimes made, that
there can be no certainty that States are
honouring their disarmament obligations
if only the fact of the reduction of armed
forces and armaments is verified, are com
pletely groundless. Actually, even today
one side does not know for sure the quan
tities of armaments and armed forces pos
sessed by the other side. In the course
of disarmament both sides will at each
stage reduce their armed forces in agreed
proportions, which will, without ques
tion, diminish the danger of a military
conflict, even though the quantities of
armed forces and armaments retained by
states will not be verified.

Furthmore, the Soviet Union has consistently argued that inspec
tion over armaments becomes a dangerous threat to national security against which all nations must guard.

2
To quote Mr. Zorin ,

the Soviet representative at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Con
ference :
From such control, which is essentially
not control over disarmament but control over
armaments, the only ones who would gain would
be those who are fostering aggressive plans,
who are interested in developing intelligence
activities in order to obtain information
about the vital centres and defense system of
a country which they regard as a potential
enemy.
The Soviet Union has also warned that there might be struggle

•HjN Doc. DC/203, 5 June 1962 (ENDC/3, 19 March 1962), Ap
pendix D. par. 32.
2UN Doc. ENDC/PV.26, 2k April 1962, p. 28.
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and stalemate if the nations of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Commission did not limit themselves to negotiations concerning
control of disarmed elements when Gromyko'1' stated:
The Soviet Government is convinced that
if all members of the Eighteen Nation Com
mittee on Disarmament seek agreement on
general and comprehensive disarmament under
strict international control, and not the
establishment of control over armaments,
the Committee would not find it difficult
to agree on controls.

Expansion of negotiations beyond this element seems to mean that
the Soviet Union will only reject what is proposed and perhaps
terminate disarmament negotiations entirely.
Whatever her reasoning for objecting to inspection of re
tained armaments and forces, the Soviet Union has continually
overlooked one serious limitation to this element.

When reduc

tions are calculated as proportions of existing forces at the
initial stage, then in order to verify that nations are adhering
to their commitments there must be inspection of the original
forces and those remaining after the reduction is completed.

Since

2
the latest Soviet proposal relies heavily on proportional reduc
tions from stage to stage, she has undermined the ability of her
own proposal to accomplish disarmament.

That the Soviet Union does

•kjN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix D, par. k2.
2See Appendix VI, p. 96.
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not intend to tolerate inspection of retained forces can be seen
by examining her proposals'^ in detail because nowhere are there
allowances made for verifying retained forces and armaments.

Other elements

Two other elements also appear in "what" the Soviet Union
wishes to have inspected, but they do not have the significant
consistency of the previous elements.

The Soviet Union would

also assign the international inspectorate the responsibility
p

of verifying reductions in conventional forces and armaments.
On the consistency scale this element received an 83.3

because

early negotiations (19^-6-1953) considered only the control of
atomic energy rather than partial or comprehensive disarmament.

''‘See Appendixes II-VII, pp. 89-103.

2See: Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, par. 2
Disarmament Program, par. a, p. 9 1 .
- Stage I, par. a, p. 92.
Stage II, par. a, p. 92.
Appendix V
- Article I, par. 2, p. 93*
Article II, pars. 1 & 3, p. 93 .
Article III, par. 2, p. 9^*
Appendix VI - 1st Stage, pars. 1-3, p. 96.
2nd Stage, par. 1, p. 96.
Appendix VII - Part 2, Chapter II, p. 98.
Part 3, Chapter VI, p. 99*
Part U, Chapter IX, Article 31, p. 100.
Appendix IV

^Appendix I, p. 88.
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Several remarks can be made so as to clarify the nature of
this element.

First, reductions are based on percentages of total

forces,-*- usually with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United States of America, and the People's Republic of China main
taining equal numbers.

Second, reductions are gradual - stage to

stage - so as to maintain an equity among the disarming nations.
Finally, the Soviet Union specifies that the end result is that
nations should have only enough armed forces and armaments "neces
sary to maintain internal security and fulfill the obligations of
the United Nations Charter."

The major obstacle to this Soviet

proposal is the lack of provisions for inspecting production facili
ties of conventional armaments.

The inspecting agency is merely

responsible for verifying the reduction of a specified number of
armaments, but nations have no way of ascertaining whether a vio
lation has occurred because the violator may be producing armaments,
as fast as the disarmament treaty is reducing them.
Also obtaining some amount of consistency (66 .7%)^ were Soviet
proposals for the liquidation of foreign bases.

The Soviet Union

has frequently contended that "foreign military bases and the

___ ^
"^See footnote 2 , p. 53 .
2Appendix V, Article III, par. 9, p. 9b.
3Appendix I, p. 88 .
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stationing of troops in the territory of other States constitute
one of the principal sources of international conflict and ten
sion.

Hie desire of the Soviet Union to eliminate foreign bases

has been mentioned in almost every Soviet proposal

2

and emphasized

in her latest proposal by making it the second element of the
first stage.

Western nations have generally rejected this effort

because it would eliminate a major portion of their military sites
before Eastern European nations reduced the number of active troops
they maintained.

However, in 1962 the Soviet Union made a signifi

cant revision in her usual interpretation of the authority of the
inspecting agency by proposing that the inspectorate not only verify,
but supervise, the dismantling of foreign b a s e s . 3

Evidently the

Soviet Union does not feel that national sovereignty would be endan
gered, or the chance of interference in domestic affairs increased,
because the agency would be supervising outside of national territory.

lUN Doc. DC/PV.72, 26 April 1965, p. 28.
O
See: Appendix III
Appendix V - Article II,
par. 2, p. 96; Appendix
tary bases and troops in

- Disarmament Program, par. c, p. 91;
par. 8 , p. 93; Appendix VI - 2nd Stage,
VII - Part 2, Chapter I (b) Foreign mili
alien territories, p. 99*
1

Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix C, Part 2, Chapter I (b).
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Soviet Inspection Proposals:

When?

It is in the area of inspection timing that the Soviet Union
has been most specific during disarmament negotiations.

Generally

speaking, her more recent proposals have included defined time
lengths for each stage and automatic shifts from stage to stage .1
However, these automatic shifts from stage to stage sometimes take
place without complete verification of the elements provided in
the previous stage.

The Soviet contention here is that inspection

can't verify every element in a disarmament program, and at some
point nations must trust one another to carry out their commitments.

2

Throughout disarmament negotiations two major elements

stand out in the timing of Soviet inspection proposals:

l)

in

spection and disarmament must be initiated simultaneously, and 2 )
inspection is progressively based on the elements that must be
verified.

When inspection is initiated

Closely related to Soviet demands for a ban on the production
and use of nuclear weapons prior to disarmament are Soviet proposals

^oc. cit., Appendix C - Part 2, Chapter IV; Part 3j Chapter
VIII; and Part IV, Chapter XI.
% e e discussion on pp. h2-h3.
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calling for inspection and disarmament to be initiated simultane
ously.^

The argument for both these elements is the same:

can be no more control than there is disarmament."

"There

In her 1962

proposal the Soviet Union specifically stated that the Interna
tional Disarmament Organization "shall begin operating as soon
as disarmament measures are initiated.
Two reasons may be given for the Soviet interest in tying dis
armament and inspection measures together.

First, as inspection

measures get underway disarmament measures are also initiated, thus
reassuring states that nations are adhering to the disarmament treaty.
The fact that disarmament measures are being carried out may make
it easier for individual nations to accept the probes of an inter
national inspectorate.

Second, the Soviet Union may actually fear

that the early establishment of an inspection system will become a
threat to her national sovereignty.

On the consistency scale this

element receives an 83 •3%^ and remains something that disarmament

^See: Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, pars. 1 & 3 S
p. 91> : Appendix IV - Stage I, pars, a & b, p. 92; Appendix
V - Article I, pars. 1 & 3, p. 93; Appendix VI - 1st Stage, par. 1,
p. 98; Appendix VII - Part 1, Article 1, and Article 2 - pars.
3 & h, p. 98.
2UN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix C, Part 1, Article 2,
par. 3 .
^Appendix I, p.' 88*.
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negotiations will continue to be confronted by.

Progressive inspection

The Soviet Union has also consistently proposed a system of
progressive inspection^ that complements the phase of disarmament
in progress.

On the consistency scale this element receives a

66 .7^7 and it should be noted that progressive inspection has
been emphasized only since 195^ in terms of partial or complete
disarmament.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have

agreed that there should be reductions in conventional armaments
and forces as well as abolition of nuclear weapons and that this
approach should take place in stages.

This approach was endorsed

by the United Nations General Assembly on November

195^ with

the concurring vote of the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union has consistently specified that

^ee:

Appendix IV

- Stage I, par. b, p. 92.
Stage II, par. c, p. 92.
Appendix V
- Article II, par.9, p. 9^*
Article III, par. 7, p. 9^»
Appendix VI - 3rd Stage, par. 9j P* 97•
Appendix VII - Part 1, Article 2, par. 2, p. 98 .

2Appendix I, p. 88 .
%ogee, Joseph, The Diplomacy of Disarmament, International
Conciliation, No. 526, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
New York, January i 960. P. 251.
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"the extent of the control and inspection exercised shall cor
respond to the stage reached in the phased disarmament of States."-*Again in 1962 the Soviet Union stipulated that "each disarmament
measure shall he accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure."

2

^
Andrei Grcmyko,-’ Soviet

representative to the United Nations, explained this method by
saying:
ihe draft treaty prepared by the Soviet
Government provides for the extention of
international control - stage by stage - to
those elements of the military machinery of
States which are subject to elimination at
the corresponding stages of disarmament.

The Soviet Union has never endorsed an inspectorate that would
begin with comprehensive powers and authority to make it a primary
force in any disarmament program.

Rather, she has contended that

the authority of the inspectorate should be extended from stage to
stage depending on what the agency is expected to accomplish.
Throughout the disarmament program the inspectorate cannot inspect
just any subject at their determination, but rather it follows a
format established by the disarmament treaty itself.

Thus, the

^Appendix VI, 3rd Stage, par. 9» p. 97*
2UN Doc. DC/203, op. eit., Appendix C, Part 1, Article 2,
par. 2 .
3loc. cit., (EMDC/3j 19 March 1962), Appendix D, Par. 33.
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timing of inspection is directly related to the elements specified
in the disarmament treaty; and the scope of the inspectorate's
authority is defined by the element being inspected.

That the tim

ing of inspection can be directly related to the phase of disarma
ment in progress is debatable, but the Soviet Union has indicated
that an unscheduled program becomes a dangerous instrument that
might violate state sovereignty.

Timing of physical inspections

There remains one other area that has received some emphasis
in Soviet proposals - the timing of physical inspections.

Western

proposals'*- have generally proposed eight to twelve inspections an
nually, plus allowing all those inspections the international agency
finds necessary to verify suspicious evidence.

The United States

has declared that acceptance of physical inspections is a minimum
condition in creating a viable disarmament program.

p

However, the Soviet Union has indicated that serious problems
could arise if the inspection agency is endowed with such generous

-kLoc. cit., (ENDC/2, 19 March 1962), Appendix B.

2Rusk, Dean, "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of April 26,
1962." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. k6 (May 1962), 795.
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authority.

In earlier proposals the Soviet Union stated that an

international control
but only

organ could carry out verificationmeasures

"without the right to interfer in the domesticaffairs

of s t a t e s . N u m e r o u s physical inspections were considered a seri
ous affront to national sovereignty.

In her 1955 proposal the

Soviet Union was more subtle by declaring that inspection teams
should have freedom of access at all times but only "within the
supervisory functions they exercise."2

In 1959j Premier Khrushchev^

clarified the Soviet position by explaining:
... that it would be possible to agree to
carry out each year a certain previously de
termined number of inspections on the terri
tory of the Soviet Union as well as the ter
ritories of the United States
of America,
Great Britain, and their possessions if the
reports of control posts would indicate...
phenomena...suspected of being nuclear ex
plosions. It is understood that such in
spections would not be numerous. I consi
der that, strictly speaking, it would not
be necessary for many trips to be made in
each country.
The Soviet Union seems to be indicating that several months between
inspections is not enough time for one nation to seriously violate

^Appendix III, Disarmament Convention, par. 3> P* 91.
2Appendix V,

Article III, par. 7(t), p. <$k.

“3

Khrushchev, Nikita,
.
Bulletin, Vol. ho (May 18, 1959), 705*

Department of State
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the disarmament treaty.

The clearest statement made on physical

inspections was made hy Premier Khrushchev'*' in 1963, when he stated:
We believe and we continue to believe
now that, in general, inspection is not
necessary and if we give our consent to an
annual quota of 2-3 inspections this is
done solely for the sake of reaching agree
ment.

On the whole the Soviet Union would probably prefer that ter
ritorial inspections be abandoned and replaced by mechanized instal
lations monitored by an impartial staff.

Since these technological

advances have not yet been made the Soviet Union accepts two or
three annual inspections as an undesirable necessity.

Soviet Inspection Proposals:

How?

Three methods of inspection were previously discussed and
analyzed.2

Of the three, the Soviet Union has consistently pro-

posed (100%)

only one - physical inspection.

In her 1955 proposal

1_______________ , "U.S.
and U.S.S.R.Exchange Views on
Nuclear Test Ban," op. cit., p. 202.
2See pp.

13-14.

^Appendix I, p. 88.
k

See Appendixes II - VII. Refer especially to: Appendix V Article I, par. 3, p. 93 ; Appendix VI - 3rd Stage, par. 9, p. 97;
and Appendix VII - Part 1, Article 2, par. 6, p. 98.
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the Soviet Union declared that the control organ would have ''rights,
powers, functions adequate to guarantee effective observance by all

1
states of agreed prohibitions and reductions."

More specifically,

concerning physical inspection the international control organ would
be allowed to "set up control posts on territory of all states con
cerned" ^ in order to verify the compliance of the participating
states.

However, the Soviet Union agreed to the establishment of

control posts only "on a basis of reciprocity, for the purpose of
supervising the fulfillments of States of their obligation."

3

It

must be noted that the Soviet Union specifically assigned the in
specting agency the responsibility of verifying the reports of the
individual states.

Once the program of general and complete disarma

ment had been completed, and only then, would the International Dis
armament Organization assume supervisory authority "over the imple
mentation by States of the obligations they have a s s u m e d . A c c e p t 
ance of physical inspection is limited by several factors.

•^Appendix V, Article I, par. 3, p. 93*
2loc. cit., Article II, par. 9? P* 9^+*
3uh Doc. DC/ll2, 1 August 195^-j Annex 12, p. 2.
^Appendix VII, Part 1, Article 2, par. 6, p. 98.
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example, the Soviet Union has never supported unlimited amounts of
"on-site" inspections,-*- nor have the Soviets supported the right
of inspection teams to investigate facilities of their own choosing.
Physical inspection is acceptable only at those sites approved by
the states or at those facilities specifically designated by the
disarmament treaty.
To the Soviets, physical inspection is seen as a supplement
to distant monitoring if there is to be assurance that underground
explosions can be identified as such.

To carry out this interpre

tation the Soviet Union has endorsed the concept of mobile inspec
tion teams.

This endorsement is limited, however, by Soviet de

clarations that inspection teams have free access at all times
"within limits of supervisory functions they exercise, to all ob
jects of control.’12

The confusing point is that the Soviet Union

does not usually assign the inspectorate supervisory authority un
til after the completion of an entire stage of disarmament.

Also

vague in this proposal is the phrase "objects of control" because
the Soviet Union has yet to define what they are.

Because of this

vagueness it is questionable whether the inspectorate can provide
the verification it should.

^See discussion on timing, pp.-59-61 .
2Appendix V, Article III, par. 7(h), p. 9k.
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the verification it should.
The Soviet Union has also endorsed the right of the inspec
tion agency to establish "aerial photography over the territories
of States"1 as a method of verification.

Once again, however,

this element does not come into being until after the program for
disarmament has been completed.

Whatever the conditions placed

on physical inspection by the Soviet Union, it remains the pri
mary method proposed in negotiations for establishing a working
inspection system.

Records inspection

Rating an 83.3% on the consistency scale,

2
records inspection

has often been proposed by the Soviet Union as an acceptable means
o
of control over the disarmament program .-1 The Soviet Union first
proposed it in 195^ when she declared that the international con
trol organ should be allowed to "collect and compile data on ex
traction, production, and utilization of atomic materials and
energy."^

Furthermore, the control organ would be allowed to call

^Appendix VI, 3rd Stage, par. 10, p. 972Appendix I, p. 88 .
^See: Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, par. 3, p.91;
Appendix IV - Stage I, par. b, p. 92 ; Appendix V - Article II,
par. 9(c), p. 9^ and Article III, par. 7(c), p. 95: Appendix VI 3rd Stage, par. 10, p. 97; and Appendix VII - Part 1, Article 2,
par. 5> p . ^ and Part 2, Chapter II, Article 13, p. 99^Appendix III, Disarmament Convention, par. 3, p.. 91.
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for information on the forces and armaments of participating
state.

But it must be recognized that such information was to

be given voluntarily by the participating states and could not
be forced from a state who refused to conform to the general
policy.

In 1955 the Soviet Union proposed that the internation

al control organ:
...have unimpeded access to records re
lating to budgetary appropriations of states
for military purposes including all decisions
of their legislative and executive organs.^-

States would not deliver all their records at once for investi
gation, but rather submit...
...such information about their armed
forces, armaments, military production and
military appropriations as are necessary to
carry out the measures of the corresponding
stage.2

Thus, states would open their records for inspection in
partial segments that would complement the phase of disarmament
taking place.

It seems "unimpeded access" would come only when

general and complete disarmament had been completed.

Perhaps,

records inspection would be more seriously considered by the Soviet

^Appendix V, Article 2, par. 9(c), p.

9k.

2UN Doc. DC/203, qp. cit., Appendix C, Part 1, Article 2,
par. 5 *
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Union if it were linked to the ban on nuclear weapons production
that she has continually stressed.

While military budget inspec

tion has been the subject of most Soviet proposals, the Soviet
emphasis on a ban for nuclear weapons production indicates that
inspection of inventory records may be more desirable.

Nonphysical inspection

Nonphysical inspection, where trained personnel question civil
ians or government employees at will, has never been endorsed by
the Soviet Union.

By scanning the proposals included in the ap

pendixes it can be seen that this method is never mentioned by the
Soviets.

Nor has the Soviet Union issued any statements about

verification by this method and so has ignored the subject, entirely.
It would seem that the Soviet Union regards nonphysical inspection
as too great an infringement on her national sovereignty and some
thing that could too easily encourage interference in domestic af
fairs.

Therefore, it seems extremely doubtful whether she would

ever support such a measure.

In fact, it is questionable whether

Western nations could see this method used to their advantage!

Soviet Inspection Proposals:

By Whom?

From the onset of disarmament negotiations in 19^-6, the Soviet
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Union has consistently stressed two elements in the organization
of an international inspection agency.

First, the Soviet Union

has consistently proposed that any international inspection agency
should he established within the framework of the United Nations.
Second, enforcement action that involves the use of military or
economic sanctions is the responsibility of the United Nations
Security Council and not the inspection agency.

Within the framework of the U.N.

In 1946 the United States proposed that an independent inter
national agency be established and given broad powers to control
the production and use of atomic energy.

The Soviet Union reacted

negatively to such a proposal, declaring that the American proposal
was:
...of such a character that in reality
such an authority would be independent of
the Security Council and would have almost
full autonomy. This cannot be reconciled
with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union further clarified her position in 194-7 when she
let it be know that she objected to an independent agency that was
not subject to the supervision of the permanent members of the

±_______________ , The Control of Atomic Energy, op. cit.,
p. 337.
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Security Council.

Gromyko-*- explained the Soviet position on the

American proposal in the following manner:
...These recommendations undermine the
foundation of the effective activities of
the Security Council, in the framework of
which an international system of control
of atomic energy should be established,
since they provide that the principle of
unanimity of the five great powers in the
Security Council should not be applied
while taking decisions on sanctions in
cases when violations of the control seg
ments is determined.

Therefore, the Soviet Union has consistently proposed (100%)

that

the establishment of an inspection agency must be within the frame
work of the United Nations, ^ preferably under the direction of the
Security Council.

i
k
In her 1954 proposal the Soviet Union declared

that the "international control organ shall be set up under the
Security Council."

But Western nations rejected this proposal be

cause they felt a permanent member would veto effective action by

_____________ , The United Mat ions Atomic Energy Commission.
International Conciliation, No. 430, Carnegie Endowment for Inter
national Peace, New York,-April 19^7* £• 277•
p
Appendix I, p. 88 .
3

See Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, par. 3, p, 91;
Appendix IV - Convention, p. 92; Appendix V - Article II, par. 5>
p. 93; and Appendix VII - Part 1, Article 2, par. 3, p. 98.
^Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, par. 3 , p. 91.
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the Security Council if the action did not mesh with their parti
cular national interest.

In her present proposal the Soviet Union

has sidestepped this dispute by proposing that the International
Disarmament Organization "be established within the framework of
the United Nations ."1

The Soviet Union has simply refused to

support an independent agency that would be endowed with such
comprehensive authority that it might eventually interfere in the
domestic affairs of the state.

The enforcement authority

The Soviet position can be further clarified by looking at
one element - who will carry out the sanctions of an inspection
system?

The Soviet Union has been adament in declaring that sanc

tions involving military or economic sanctions are singularly the
responsibility of the Security Council.

Thus, Soviet inspection

proposals have given the inspectorate identification and verifica
tion authority;

but they specifically stipulate that reactions

to violations are the jurisdiction of the Security Council.

p

The Soviet Union made her position clear in 19^+6 when Gramyko3

^Appendix VII, Part 1, Article 2, par. 3, p. 98.
p

VII

See:
Appendix V - Article III,par. 8 , p. 95 ; and Appendix
- Part5, Article k 2 , par. 2(c), p. 1°2.

3_______________, The Control of Atomic Energy, op.cit.,
p. 378.
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explained:
I should like to make it again clear the
position of the Soviet Union that we cannot
accept any proposal that would undermine any
degree the principle of unanimity of the
permanent members of the Security Council in
the maintenance of peace and security.

In 1959 the Soviet Union proposed a list of items that she
considered
ment.

should be covered by a veto or permanent memberagree

The following list is so

comprehensive in nature thatit

virtually destroys the independent agency Western powers hoped to
establish.

The list1 of items subject to veto included the fol

lowing:

1 . amendments to the treaty
2 . all matters relating to treaty vio
lations .
3 . the dispatch of inspection teams to
investigate events which might be nuclear ex
plosions
4.
the findings of such inspection teams
5 . improvements to the control system
6 . positioning of control posts
7 . establishment of aircraft sampling
routes, and all fiscal, administrative, lo
gistics, and personnel questions
It would seem that the Soviet Union does not intend to sacrifice
herright of veto in anything that

would change the nature of the

inspection system or involve facilities pertaining to her national

1______________ , The Control of Atomic Energy, op. cit., p. 378.
Subcommittee of U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Geneva Test Ban negotiations. 86th Congress, First Session, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C., March 25, 1959* P. 5.
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interest.
The Soviet Union's basic position on this element has not
changed throughout the 19^-6-1966 disarmament negotiations.

In

1962 the Soviet Union again emphasized the right of permanent
members to exercise a veto over sanctions of the inspection sys
tem by declaring:
It goes without saying that the interna
tional disarmament organization will not and
cannot be entrusted with any functions in
volving the execution of preventive or en
forcement measures in regard to States. The
business of the international organ is to
establish facts. If in connection with
those facts the need should arise of taking
action to safeguard peace and security, this
would, as heretofore, be exclusively within
the competence of the Security Council which
is the sole body empowered by the United Na
tions Charter to take such action.^
Therefore, the Soviet Union denies any international inspectorate
the role of enforcement authority and assigns it only that authority
necessary to verify known or suspected violations.

A search for parity?

There is some evidence to indicate that the Soviet Union is
looking for an inspection system that gives her a stronger sense
of equality with Western nations.

Her feeling of insecurity seems

to lie in the fact that any board or agency where nuclear powers

•kjN Doc. DC/203, op cit., Appendix D, par. 30 .
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had. equal voting power would put her in a minority position. 1
The early emphasis on establishing the inspection agency under
the Security Council would have given the Soviet Union effective
veto power over any decision.
Today, however, the Sovxet Union has proposed new organs

2

that deny her the use of the veto (except in cases involving
sanctions) but give her a better sense of representation.

In

her 1962 proposal, it is the Control Council which would super
vise and verify the implementation of the disarmament treaty.
The Soviet Union has stipulated that its composition must ensure
"proper representation of the three principal groups of states
existing in the w o r l d " 3 _ Western, "socialist," and nonaligned.
Thus, the Soviet Union seems to feel that her influence in this
case would be at least as great as the more numerous Western na
tions that have nuclear weapons.

This element - control of the

inspectorate either by the Security Council or the newer Control
.

Council - rates 100% on the consistency scale.

ii

At the very least,

this kind of emphasis indicates that the Soviet Union considers

•^See quote, pp. 29-30*
2Appendix VII, Part 5 3 Articles 40-^2, pp. 101-103.
^UN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix C, Part 5, Article k2,
par. 1 (b), p. 129.
^Appendix I, p. 88.
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the voting procedure in the inspectorate a significant element
for further negotiation.

Other elements

Two other elements also appear consistent in Soviet proposals
for organizing an international inspectorate.

First, inspectors

for the international organization would be selected on an "inter
national basis."

Although this statement has never been explained

in detail, the Soviet Union seems to be implying that all nations
would be represented and that the inspectors would be selected
on their impartiality and training.

But, in her latest proposal,

the Soviet Union has also stipulated that inspectors must be se
lected in a manner adequately representative of "the three princi
pal groups of States existing in the world ."1
Second, the Soviet Union has also endorsed the concept that
some "permanent observors" can be stationed in each nation on a
reciprocal basis.

However, in 1955 the Soviet proposal limited

permanent observors to the "objects of control" that fall within
their supervisory functions.

2

Her latest proposal seems even

more confusing, as permanent observors can be used either on a

■kjH Doc. DC/205, op. cit., Part 5> Article 1+2, par. 2(3), p. 129.
2Appendix V, Article III, par. 7 (b), p. 9^*
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temporary or permanent basis.-*-

Whether observors are temporary

or permanent depends on the nature of the disarmament measure
being carried out.

If constant supervision is necessary to assure

compliance of a specified measure, then observors become permanent
for that purpose.

A permanent staff that continually verifies

the whole of the disarmament program comes into being only after

2
general and complete disarmament is completed.

^-Appendix VII, Part 1, Article 2, par. 4, p. 98 .
^loc. cit., par. 6, p. 98 .
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IV. THE PATTERN OF EMPHASIS IN
SOVIET INSPECTION PROPOSALS

Even though the Soviet Union seems to be hazy and unclear
in the proposals she submits during inspection negotiations,
there is a pattern of emphasis that emerges.

The pattern of

emphasis developed here is based on the constant elements the
Soviet Union has proposed in inspection proposals from 19^6
to present, which were outlined in the previous chapters.

The

remaining objective of this thesis is to define the specific
elements reflected in the Soviet pattern of emphasis and analyze
them for what they may or may not mean in developing an inspec
tion system.
The following list summarizes the constant elements that
were found in the Soviet inspection proposals from 19^6 to date;

1 . a ban on the use of nuclear weapons
prior to the initiation of any disarmament
program or the establishment of an inspec
tion system
2 . a ban on the production of nuclear
weapons, verified by an inspection system
3 . inspection of only those forces and
armaments reduced or eliminated by the dis
armament treaty and not those weapons, in
stallations, and forces retained by the in
dividual states
if. verification of reductions in con
ventional forces and armaments
5 . verification and supervision of
the liquidation of foreign bases and the
withdrawal of foreign troops
6 . the initiation of the disarmament
program simultaneously with the establish
ment of an inspection system

•^Appendix I, p. 88.
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7 . endorsement of a system of progres
sive inspection, where the inspectorate's
powers and authority correspond to the
phase of disarmament in progress
8 . a limit of 2-3 "on-site" inspec
tions per year in each nation's territory
9 . endorsement of physical inspection
as a method of verification
10. endorsement of records inspection
as a method of verification
11. establishment of the inspection
organization within the framework of the
United Nations
12. economic or military sanctions re
sulting from the identification and veri
fication of a disarmament violation remain
the responsibility and prerogative of the
United Nations Security Council.
13. concern over who controls the in
spection agency and the voting procedure
to be used in the organization
ll+. inspectors for the International
Disarmament Organization to be selected on
an "international basis"; in the 1960s an
added stipulation that inspectors equally
represent Western, socialist, and nona
ligned nations
15. endorsement of some permanent ob
servors at "points of control"

These constant elements seem to reflect the basic Soviet interpre
tation of inspection and disarmament in general.

Each element

seems to be based on broader tenets of Soviet disarmament policy,
stressing a pattern of emphasis which includes:

l) defense of

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Soviet state and its
allies against international control that might lead to subversion,
and 2) the establishment of parity within the inspection system
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so as to neutralize the numerical advantage enjoyed by Western
powers.

Defense of Sovereignty

Since all nations show concern with protecting their na
tional sovereignty when entering something that is supra-na
tional in character, it should be no surprise that the Soviet
Union apparently believes the establishment of an inspection
agency may be a threat to the nature of her governmental system.
Obviously, acceptance of inspection further opens Soviet society
to the observation of outsiders which might endanger the exist
ing hegemony of the regime.

The Soviet decision-makers apparent

ly believe that inspection will inject "heretical influences"
and pose a threat to their undisputed control.

The problem be

comes unsolvable especially when the goals of any international
inspection agency are adverse to the goals of a major power.
Furthermore, if it can be contended that there is evidence
of bad faith by some governments, why not acknowledge that such
bad faith can also be shown by the staff of an inspection agency?
It would seem that the Soviet Union does have some significant
reasons for objecting to the establishment of a comprehensive in
spection system.
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The foundation for inspection

The Soviets have built the basis for an inspection system in
their proposals for bans on the use and production of nuclear wea
pons.

The conventions prohibiting the construction and employment

of nuclear weapons becomes the legal focus of what an inspection
system should verify.

The Soviets also find this approach desirable

because disarmament begins first, thereby serving as a determin
ing factor that nations are really interested in disarmament.
Participants would prove their interest by disarming, in fact, not
by holding up disarmament measures until other obligations have
been satisfied.

The prior establishment of an inspection system

is a threat to the Soviet Union because there is no assurance that
Western nations will adhere to the disarmament program even after
the inspection agency is established.

Also, there is no reason to

believe that the premature establishment of an inspection system
will not become a legalized system of international espionage.
Acceptance of this element could also mean a halt to the arms
race while allowing nations to maintain the weapons they already
have.

Obviously, this approach also serves Soviet propaganda as

it is the Soviets that are calling for disarmament now while other
nations are delaying the process for complex reasons.

Because the

bans on the use and production of nuclear weapons would limit the
focus of future agency action, the Soviet Union apparently feels
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that national sovereignty would be protected from possible un
limited probes by an inspection organization.

Timing of inspection

To tne Soviets the inspectorate's responsibilities and author
ity are directly related to the phase of disarmament in progress.
Inspection is thus defined by the armaments and forces being reduc
ed or eliminated in the current phase.

Only when the phase of dis

armament in progress has been completed, does the inspecting agency
take on supervisory functions over all the areas of the disarmament
treaty.

To do otherwise, the Soviets contend, could seriously jeo

pardize the sovereignty of each state.

If the authority of the in

spection agency is not limited to the elements of the disarmament
program, the Soviets feel that nations are offering an open opportun
ity for the inspectorate to expand its powers at its discretion.
Thus, the chances are increased for the inspectorate to involve it
self at will with the domestic and nondisarmament affairs of a
state.

To avoid this possibility, the Soviets project a system in

which disarmament and inspection are initiated simultaneously.
Sovereignty is therefore protected from unwarranted inspection probes
by the confinements of the disarmament treaty.
The cirtical problem with this Soviet interpretation is whether
the inspection agency can accomplish its responsibility when viewed
in such a limited manner.

For the inspection organization to assure
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compliance of the involved participants in a disarmament program,
the agency should be established and working prior to each disarma
ment phase.

In this way, all nations are confident the agency can

accomplish its assignment.

However, in the Soviet interpretation

the inspection agency is denied the authority to work in any area
until disarmament has begun within the particular field.

Under

these circumstances the inspection system is weakest exactly at
the time when it should be operating at its full strength - the
beginning of a new phase of disarmament.

Each nation's sovereignty

may be protected from interference by the inspectorate before dis
armament begins, but comprehensive knowledge of whether all nations
are adhering to the beginning phases of disarmament is denied.

Al

though the Soviet Union does have a point, it is questionable whether
her proposed method is conducive to developing a workable inspection
system.

Method of inspection

Physical "on-site" inspections have been consistently proposed
by the Soviet Union as a method for the inspecting agency to carry
out its activities;

but it is unlikely, to say the least, that the

Soviet Union will ever allow the inspectorate unlimited prerogatives
in the use of this measure.

Since the inspection system verifies

the results of the disarmed elements, it would seem "on-site" inspec
tions would take place only when the state announces the element is
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completed.

The Soviet Union has endorsed permanent observors -

but only at "points of control."

Although this measure has yet

to be clarified, it would seem this means at installations from
which a surprise attach can be initiated.

This limited interpre

tation would exclude vital areas, like production facilities, that
provide positive assurance that states are adhering to the obli
gations of the disarmament treaty.
The Soviet Union has also limited physical inspections to two
or three per year because she contends that the few months between
inspections are not enough for nations to seriously violate the
disarmament treaty.

This approach denies the inspectorate the author

ity to check suspicious activities when they occur;

and if the de

lay is too long, states might even be able to cover their violations
before detection.

Indeed, this approach denies the inspectorate

the capacity to provide knowledge of what has happened precisely
at the time when most nations would need the assurance that a seri
ous violation has not been committed.

The Soviets have inferred

that inspections can be allowed, perhaps on a reciprocal basis, at
some installations if staffed by impartial teams.

Such concessions

are acceptable if one desires disarmament at any cost;

but they

hardly provide the barest format on which a viable, acceptable ar
rangement can be based.
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The Soviets have also endorsed records inspection as an ac
ceptable method of verification.

But it has long been recognized

that this method has serious defects because bookkeeping can be
juggled to cover errors.

Despite the fact that military budget

inspection has often been proposed, it just lacks the positive
assurance that an inspection system must be capable of giving.
Inventory inspection seems to offer clearer evidence of each
nation's compliance, but as yet it has not been a method the
Soviets have often proposed.

Soviet concern over sovereignty

The flaw in what seems to be the Soviet reasoning in inspection
is that there is no way to assure all these elements - bans on the
use and production of nuclear weapons, inspection of disarmed ele
ments, initiation of disarmament and inspection simultaneously, pro
gressive inspection, physical and records inspection as methods of
verification - are being carried out without verification throughout
the disarmament program.

No nation would reduce or eliminate strate

gic weapons without absolute assurance that at the end of the phase
in progress the other participants have already done likewise.
fication of the result is not enough in disarmament;

Veri

there must be

assurance that nations are complying during each phase.
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There are standard assertions that the Soviet Union is mel
lowing or in a state of transition and that, because of this
change, she might liberalize her views on establishing an inspec
tion system.

However, it appears that the Soviet leadership is

equally concerned with maximizing the existing power structure
while facilitating change.

As early as 19*+7 the Soviet Union es

tablished her concern for protecting, her sovereignty when Gromyko1
stated:
Strict international control and inspec
tion of atomic energy should be established.
At the same time this strict international
control and strict inspection should not
develop into interference with those branches
of industry which are not connected with the
production of atomic energy...I deem it ne
cessary to emphasize the granting of broad
rights and powers of such a kind to the con
trol organ is incompatible with State sov
ereignty. Therefore, such proposals are un
acceptable and must be rejected as unfounded.

Establishment of Parity

For any nation to enter a disarmament program requires selfconfidence.

First, a nation must have self-confidence in her own

stability as a nation and the self-assurance that her system will
not be challenged, altered, or destroyed while participating in a
disarmament program.

Second, a nation must have confidence in the

x____________
,TheUnited Nations Atomic Energy Commission,
op. cit., pp. 280 & 283.
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disarmament program itself;

the assurance that it will work and

yet not undermine her influence and position as a nation.

Through

out inspection negotiations the Soviet Union has displayed signifi
cant concern about how an International Disarmament Organization
will be organized and the voting procedure to be used when making
decisions.

It would seem that the Soviet Union presently regards

herself in a minority position when opposed by the more numerous
Western nations.

The Soviet fear seems to be that the Western na

tions would have the controlling votes and that decisions taken by
these nations could be prejudiced against the Soviet Union.'*'

To

avoid this sense of insecurity the Soviet Union has usually pro
posed that significant decisions should be made by the United Na
tions Security Council.

As a permanent member of the Security Coun

cil, the Soviet Union could preserve her influence through the use,
or threat of use, of the veto.

However, Western nations rejected

this measure because any one of the permanent members could veto
action that seemed against their best interest.

More recently, the
O

Soviet Union has introduced and supported the Control Council.
Since Western, socialist, and nonaligned nations would be equally
represented, any split between Western and socialist nations would

^See quote, pp. 29-30 2Appendix VII, Part 5> Article 42, p. 102.
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place the decisive power in the hands of nonaligned nations.

Evi-

dentally the Soviet Union feels that in this system both Western
and socialist nations would have equal influence as they bargained
for nonaligned votes.
However, the Soviet Union still denies the right of the in
spectorate to take responsive action when a violation has been
determined.1

The international inspectorate is assigned the re

sponsibility of establishing facts in regards to the compliance of
the participants.

If, in connection with the established facts, a

need arises for taking action to safeguard peace, any responsive
measure would be "exclusively within the competence of the Secur
ity Council which is the sole body empowered by the United Nations
Charter to take such action."

In this way the agreement of all

the permanent members would be necessary before economic or mili
tary sanctions could be employed against a violator.

Thus, perman

ent members of the Security Council would maintain their power and
influence through the veto.

Is Inspection Possible?

Whether or not an acceptable inspection system can ever be
developed is debatable because as yet there is no proof that na
tions are sincerely interested in establishing a disarmament program.

^Loc. cit., Article b-2, par. 2 (c), p. 102.
2UN D o c . DC/203, op. cit., Appendix D, par. 30.
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However, any final program might resemble and reflect some of those
elements that the major nuclear powers have stressed during negotia
tions.

Although the constant elements discussed here may not re

flect the ultimate goals of the Soviet Union, they are indices
for negotiation.

The fact that there is a pattern of emphasis may

increase the chances for developing an acceptable inspection pro
gram.

Obviously, these constant elements cannot really be divorced

from the whole of Soviet foreign policy, the international environ
ment, the positions of other nations, or the nature of inspection
itself.

Simultaneously, each element must be reviewed in terms

of the Soviet interpretation of sovereignty and her role in the
contemporary world.

It must be noted that a change in any one of

these facets could easily delete some, or even all, of these "con
stant" elements.

However, these elements have withstood several

changes in Soviet strategic thought as well as two decades of dis
armament negotiations.

Therefore, we offer them not as a remedy

or interpretation of inspection, but rather they are offered as
an approach through which inspection negotiations can be continued.
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-information for this chart is taken from the Soviet inspection proposals
presented in Appendixes II - VII, pp. 89-IO3 .
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APPENDIX II
Draft International Convention To Prohibit the Production and
Employment of Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic Energy for the
Purpose of Mass Destruction
(19^+6)

Article 1. The high contracting parties solemnly declare that
they are unanimously resolved to prohibit the production and em
ployment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and for
this purpose assume the following obligations:
(a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances
whatsoever;
(b) to prohibit the production and storing of wea
pons based on the use of atomic energy;
(c) to destroy, within a period of three months
from the day of entry into force of the present
convention, all stocks of atomic weapons wheth
er in a finished or unfinished condition.
Article 2. The high contracting parties declare that any vio
lation of Article 1 of the present convention is a most serious
international crime against humanity.
Article 3. The high contracting parties shall, within a period
of six months from the day of entry into force of the present con
vention, pass legislation providing severe penalties for viola
tors of the statutes of the present convention.
Article

k. The

present convention shall be on indefinite duration.

Article 5• The present convention shall be open for the adhesion
of any State whether a Member or nonmember of the United Nations.
Article 6 . The present convention shall come into force after its
approval by the Security Council and after the ratification and
delivery of ratification documents to the Secretary-General for
safekeeping by one half of the signatory States, including all
the Member States of the United Nations named in Article 23 of
the Charter of the Organization.
Article 7. After the entry into force of the present convention
it shall be binding on all States whether Members of nonmembers
of the United Nations.
Article

8 . The

present convention, of which the Russian,
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French, English, and. Spanish texts shall be authentic, is drawn
up in one copy and shall be kept in the archives of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall com
municate certified copies to all parties to the convention.

Concerning the Organization of the Work of the
Atomic Energy Commission
I.
Establishment of Committees of the Commission - Committee
for the Exchange of Scientific Information... - Committee for the
Prevention of the Use of Atomic Energy to the Detriment of Mankind
This committee shall be set up to carry out the aims set
forth in points (b), (c), and (d) of item 5 of tbe resolution of
the General Assembly.
The task of the committee shall be to elaborate recommenda
tions :
(1) concerning the drafting of an international conven
tion for outlawing weapons based on the use of atomic energy and
prohibiting the production and use of such weapons and all other
similar kinds of weapons capable of being used for mass destruction;
(2 ) concerning the quest for and establishment of mea
sures to prohibit the production of weapons based on the use of
atomic energy and to prevent the use of atomic weapons and all other
main kinds of weapons capable of being used for mass destruction;
(3 ) concerning the measures, systems, and organization
of control over the observance of the terms of the above-mentioned
international convention for the outlawing of atomic weapons;
(4) concerning the elaboration of a system of sanctions
to be applied against the unlawful use of atomic energy.
II.
III.

Composition of the Committees...
Rules of Procedure of the Committees...

**Convention taken from:
Division of Intercourse and Education, Documents for the Year 1946. International Conciliation, Nos. 417-426, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, New York, 1946. Pp. 371-375•
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APPENDIX I I I
P ro p o sa l - 11 June 1954

Disarmament Convention should include:
("l"5 Unconditional prohibition of use, production,
conservation of atomic, hydrogen, and other types of weapons of
mass destruction.
(2) Major reductions in all armed forces and conven
tional armaments.
(3) International control organ shall be set up under
Security Council to carry out measures of control over atomic un
dertakings and conventional armaments. With regard to undertak
ings for extracting atomic crudes and producing atomic materials
and energy, organ shall: l) inspect without the right to inter
fere in domestic affairs of states; 2 ) collect and compile data
on extraction, production, and utilization of atomic materials and
energy. Organ shall call for, and verify when submitted by states
information on armaments and armed forces; make recommendations
to government and Security Council on matters relating to produc
tion, conservation, and utilization of atomic materials and energy,
and the reduction of armaments and armed forces of states.
World Conference on general reduction of armaments and prohibition
of atomic weapons to be convened in 1955.
Convention to be submitted for approval of Security Council. To
enter into force upon ratification by the five permanent members
of the Security Council.
Disarmament Program:
fa) 1/3 reduction during the year following entry into
force of convention of all armaments, all land, naval, air force;
(b) 1/3 reduction within one year of military expendi
ture to 1953-195*+ level:
(c) obligation of states parties to Convention not to
maintain military air, or naval bases on the territories of other
States and to liquidate any such existing bases within one year.

Information taken from:
Winslow, Anne (ed.), Issues Before the Tenth General Assembly.
International Conciliation, No. 504, Carnegie Endowment for Inter
national Peace, New York, 1955* P* 19.
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APPENDIX IV
U.S.S.R. Draft Resolution in General Assembly
1st Committee - 30 Sept. 195^

Convention: U.N. Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit
for confirmation to Security Council. Implementation of the
following proposal to take place on the basis of the French
and U.K. proposal of June 195^*
Stage I. Simultaneously:
a. reduction in course of 6 months (or 1 year) of arma
ments, armed forces, and budgetary appropriations to extent of
5 0 of agreed levels - (those existing 31 December 1953)*
b. temporary international control commission to be es
tablished under Security Council with right to require states
to provide necessary information on measures taken by them to
reduce armaments and armed forces. Commission to take neces
sary steps to supervise fulfillment by states of these obliga
tions. States to supply commission at established intervals
with information concerning implementation of measures in Con
vention.
Stage II. Simultaneously:
a. reduction of second 50% in course of 6 months (or 1
year).
b. complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, other wea
pons of mass destruction, production to be discontinued and wea
pons eliminated from armaments of states; all existing atomic
materials to be used only for peaceful purposes. These measures
to be completed not later than carrying out of (a).
c. standing international supervisory organ to be set up
for supervision of implementation of Convention; to have full
powers of supervision.
Disarmament Commission to study "proposal concerning prohibition
of use of nuclear weapons except in defense against aggression"
in Anglo-French Memorandum of 11 June 195^*

Draft resolution taken from:
Winslow, Anne (Ed.), Issues Before the Tenth General Assembly.
International Conciliation, No. 50U, Carnegie Endowment for Inter
national Peace, New York, 1955- Pp- 21-22.
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APPENDIX V
S o v i e t P r o p o s a l - 1 0 M ay 1 9 5 5

Convention shall provide:
I.

General:
1. Complete prohibition of use, production both of nuclear
and all other weapons of mass destruction, and conversion of exist
ing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes.
2. Major reduction in all armed forces, conventional arma
ments.
3. Establishment of control organ with rights, powers, func
tions adequate to guarantee effective observance by all states
of agreed prohibitions, reductions.
II.

Measures to be taken in 1956:
1. No increase in armed forces, conventional armaments, or
level of military expenditures above level of 31 December 1954•
Measures to be carried out within 2 months of entry into force
of Convention.
2. China, France, U.K., U.S.S.R., U.S., within 1 month of
entry into force of Convention, to furnish Disarmament Commission
with full official figures of armed forces, conventional armaments,
expenditures for military requirements.
3. Reduction of armed forces of China, U.S.S.R., U.S. to 1-1.5
million; France, U.K. to 650,000...corresponding reduction of con
ventional armaments. Reduction to take place in course of 1 year
by 50io of difference between levels of 31 December 1954 and reduced
level specified above. Corresponding reduction of appropriations.
4. Size of reduction of armaments of states, including that
of Great Powers to be established on basis of simple agreed cri
teria.
5. International Commission to be set up to report to the
Security Council and General Assembly on fulfillment of pledges
by states.
6 . With initiation of measures to effect first 5Qfj0 of re
duction of armed forces and armaments, and before entry into
force of complete prohibition of atonic weapons, states to pledge
themselves not to use nuclear weapons except for purposes of de
fense against aggression.
7. As one of the first steps in reduction states will dis
continue tests of atomic weapons.
8 . States possessing military, naval, and air bases in
territories of other states to pledge themselves to liquidate
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9^
these bases. The bases to be liquidated to be dealt with in
supplementary agreement.
9. International control organ to be set up by General
Assembly with following rights and powers:
a. set up control posts on territory of all
states concerned, on basis of reciprocity;
b. require from states any information on execu
tion of reduction measures;
c. have unimpeded access to records relating
to budgetary appropriations of states for
military purposes including all decisions
of their legislative and executive organs.
Information on execution of measures to be
provided periodically by states.
Measures to be taken in 1957:
1. Production of atomic and hydrogen weapons to be dis
continued immediately, budgetary appropriations reduced cor
respondingly.
2. China, France, U.K., U.S.S.R., U.S. to reduce armed
forces and armaments by remaining 5
as well as appropria
tions for armed forces and conventional armaments. During
this stage measures for reducing armaments and armed forces
of other states to levels set at Disarmament Conference to be
completed.
3. After completion of one-half of remaining reduction,
complete prohibition of use of atomic, hydrogen and other wea
pons of mass destruction go into effect. Elimination of these
weapons to begin with final 25$ of reduction of armaments and
armed forces - both processes to be finished by end of 1957All atomic materials to be used for peaceful purposes.
4. All states to promote cooperation in peaceful uses of
atomic energy. Special attention to under-developed countries.
5. Measures for liquidation of foreign military, naval,
and airbases in territories of other states to be completed.
6 . Questions of obligations of China under this Convention
to be discussed with participation of People’s Republic of China.
7. Control organ shall have rights and powers to:
a. exercise supervision, including inspection on
a continuous basis;
b. have in all signatory states a permanent
staff of inspectors, having access at all
times, within limits of supervisory func
tions they exercise, to all objects of con
trol;
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c.

unimpeded, access to records of budgetary ap
propriations of States for military purposes
including all legislative and executive or
ders. Information on execution of measures
to be provided periodically by states.
8 . Control organ to make recommendations to Security Coun
cil on infringements of Convention.
9. On completion of all measures enumerated above, it would
be desirable if the Great Powers further reduced their armed
forces and armaments to levels strictly necessary to maintain in
ternal security and fulfill obligations of the United Nations
Charter.

the Tenth General Assembly.
International Conciliation, No. 504, Carnegie Endowment for Inter
national Peace, New York, 1955* Pp- 23-29.
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APPENDIX V I
S o v ie t P r o p o sa l - 19 S e p t.

1959

1st Stage 1. The reduction, under appropriate control of the strength
'of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United States of America and the People's Republic of China
to the level of 1.7 million men, and of those of the U.K. and
France to the level of 650,000 men;
2. The reduction of the strength of the armed forces of
other states to levels to be agreed upon at a special session
of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world conference
on general and complete disarmament;
3. The reduction of the armaments and military equipment
at the disposal of the armed forces of the States to the extent
necessary to ensure that the remaining quantity of armaments cor
responds to the level fixed for the armed forces.
2nd Stage 1. The completion of the disbandment of the armed forces
retained by States;
2. The elimination of all military bases in foreign States.
Troops and military personnel shall be withdrawn from the terri
tories of foreign States to within their own national frontiers
and shall be disbanded.
3rd Stage 1. The destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and mis
siles ;
2.
The destruction of air force equipment;
3.
The entry into force of the prohibition of the produc
tion, possession and storage of means of chemical and bacterial
weapons in the possession of States shall be removed and destroy
ed under international supervision;
k. Scientific research for military purposes and the devel
opment of weapons and military equipment shall be prohibited;
5. War Ministries, general staffs and all military and para
military establishments and organizations shall be abolished;
6 . All military courses and training shall be terminated,
States shall prohibit by law the military education of young peo
ple.
7. In accordance with their respective constitutional pro
cedures, States shall enact legislation abolishing military ser
vice in all its forms - compulsory, voluntary, by recruitment,
and so forth, and prohibit the re-establishment in overt or covert
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form of any military or para-military establishments and organi
zations ;
8 . The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any
form, whether from State budgets or from public organizations,
shall be discontinued. The funds made available as a result of
the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be
used to reduce or abolish taxation of the population, to subsi
dize national economies and to furnish extensive economic and
technical assistance to underdeveloped countries;
9. For the purpose of supervising the implementation of the
measures of general and complete disarmament, an international
control organ shall be established. The extent of the control
and inspection exercised shall correspond to the stage reached
in the phased disarmament of States;
10.
Upon the completion of general and complete disarmament,
which shall include the disbandment of all services of the armed
forces and the destruction of all types of weapons, including
weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, rocket, chemical, bacterial),
the international control organ shall have access to all objects
of control. It may institute a system of aerial photography over
the territories of States.

1959 Proposal taken from:
UN Doc. A/U219, 19 September 1959, Annexes, Agenda Item 70,
p£LTS. 71-73-
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APPENDIX VII
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict international control
Preamble...
Part 1. General
Article 1 - Disarmament obligations
Article 2 - Control obligations
1. The State Parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake
to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end,
under strict international control, and to ensure implementation
in their territories of all control measures set forth in Parts
2, 3 and 4 of the present Treaty.
2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by
such control measures as are necessary for verification of that
measure.
3. To implement control over disarmament, an Inter
national Disarmament Organization including all State Parties to
the Treaty, shall be established within the framework of the
United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament
measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the Inter
national Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in
Part 5 of the present Treaty.
4. In all countries parties to the Treaty the IDO shall
have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way to
insure the adequate representation on it of all three existing
groups of States. This staff shall exercise control, on a tempor
ary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure
being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obli
gations to reduce or eliminate armaments and their production and
to reduce or disband their armed forces.
5. The State Parties to the Treaty shall in good time
submit to the IDO such information about their armed forces, arma
ments, military production and military appropriations as are ne
cessary to carry out the measures of the corresponding stage.
6 . Upon completion of the program of general and com
plete disarmament the IDO snail be kept in being to maintain super
vision over the implementation by States of the obligations they
have assumed, so as to prevent the re-establishment of the mili
tary potential of the States in any form whatsoever.
Article 3. - Obligations to maintain international peace and
security
Part 2. First Stage of General and Complete Disarmament
Article 4 - First Stage tasks
Chapter I - Elimination of the means of delivering nuclear
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weapons and foreign military bases on alien territories, and with
drawal of foreign troops from those territories. Control over
such measures.
A. Means of delivery
Article 5 - Elimination of rockets capable of delivering
nuclear weapons
Article 6 - Elimination of military aircraft, capable
of delivering nuclear weapons
Article 7 - Elimination of all surface warships, capa
ble of being used as vehicles for nuclear
weapons, and submarines
Article 8 - Elimination of all artillery systems,
capable of serving as a means of deliver
ing nuclear weapons
B. Foreign military bases and troops in alien terri
tories
Article 9 - Dismantling of foreign military bases
Article 10- Withdrawal of foreign troops from alien
territories
Chapter II - Reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments
and military expenditures. Control over such measures.
Article 11- Reduction of armed forces and conventional
armaments
Article 12- Reduction of conventional armaments produc
tion
Article 13- Reduction of military expenditures
Chapter III - Measures to Safeguard the Security of States.
Article 1^+- Restriction of displacements of the means
of delivering nuclear weapons
Article 15- Control over launchings of rockets for peace
ful purposes
Article 16- Prevention of the further spread of nuclear
weapons
Article 17- Prohibition of nuclear test
Article 18- Measures to strengthen the capacityof the
United Nations to ensure international
peace and security
Chapter IV - Time-limits for Measures of the First Stage.
Transition from First Stage to Second Stage.
Article 19- Time-limits for measures of the firststage
Article 20- Transition from first to second
Part 3 . Second Stage of General and Complete Disarmament
Article 21- Second stage tasks
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Chapter V - Elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological
and radiological weapons. Control of such measures.
Article 22- Elimination of nuclear weapons
Article 23- Elimination of chemical, biological,
and radiological weapons
Chapter VI - Further reduction of armed forces, conventional
armaments and military expenditures. Control over such measures.
Article 2k- Further reduction of armed forces and
conventional armaments
Article 25- Further reduction of conventional armaments
production
Article 26- Further reductions of military expenditures
Chapter VII - Measures to safeguard the security of States.
Article 27- Continued strengthening of the capacity of
the United Nations to ensure international
peace and security
Chapter VIII - Time-limits for measures of the second stage.
Transition from second to third stage.
Article 28- Time-limits for measures of the second
stage
Article 29- Transition from second to third stage
Part 4.

Third Stage of General and Complete Disarmament
Article 30- Third stage tasks
Chapter IX - Completion of the elimination of the military
machinery of states. Control over such measures.
Article 31- Completion of the elimination of armed
forces and conventional armaments
Article 32- Complete cessation of military production
Article 33- Abolition of military establishments
Article 3*+- Abolition of military conscription and mili
tary training
Article 35- Prohibition of the appropriation of funds
for military purposes
Chapter X - Measures to safeguard the Security of States and
to maintain international peace.
Article 36- Contingents of police (militia)
Article 37- Police (militia) units to be made available
to the Security Council
Article 38- Control over the prevention of the re-establ
ishment of armed forces
Chapter XI - Time-limits for measures of the third stage
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Article 39- Time-limits for the third stage
Part 5- Structure and Functions of the International Disarma
ment Organization
Article bO- Functions and main bodies
The International Disarmament Organization, to be
set up under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the present Treaty,
hereinafter referred to as the "Organization," shall consist of
a Conference of all States Parties to the Treaty, hereinafter re
ferred to as the "Conference," and a Control Council, hereinafter
referred to as the "Council." The Organization shall deal with
questions pertaining to the supervision of compliance by States
with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions
connected with the safeguarding of international peace and se
curity, which may arise in the course of the implementation of
the present Treaty, including preventive enforcement measures,
shall be decided on by the Security Council in conformity with
its powers under the United Nations Charter.
Article 4l- The Conference
1. The Conference shall comprise all States Parties
to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year,
and special sessions which may be convened on decision by the Coun
cil or at the request of a majority of the States Parties to the
Treaty with a view to considering matters connected with the im
plementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions
shall be held at the Headquarters of the Organization, unless
otherwise decided by the Conference.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty shall have one
vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a
simple majority, and on all other matters by a two-thirds majority.
In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Con
ference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertain
ing to the measures of control over the implementation of general
and complete disarmament, and may make recommendations to the
State Parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter
or measure.
4. The Conference shall:
(a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;
(b) Consider the annual, and any special, re
ports of the Council;
(c) Approve reports to be submitted to the
Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
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(d)

Approve the budget recommendations of

the Council;
(e) Approve amendments to the present Trea.ty
in accordance with Article 47 of the present Treaty;
(f) Take decisions on any matter specifically
referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;
(g) Propose matters for consideration by the
Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relat
ing to the functions of the Council;
Article 42 - The Control
1. The Council shall consist of;
(a) The five States permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council;
(b) ...(number) other State Parties to the
Treaty elected by the Conference for a period of two years. The
composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of
the three principal groups of states existing in the world.
2. The Council shall;
(a) Direct in practice the measures of control
over the implementation of general and complete disarmament; set
up such bodies at Headquarters of the Organization as it deems ne
cessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures
for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regula
tions in accordance with the present Treaty;
(b) Submit to the Conference annual reports
and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare;
(c) Be in constant touch with the United Na
tions Security Council as the organ bearing the main responsibil
ity for the maintenance of peace and security; periodically in
form it of the progress achieved in the implementation of gener
al and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infri
ngements by the States Parties to the Treaty of their disarmament
obligations under the present Treaty;
(d) Review the results of the implementation
of the measures included in each stage of general and complete
disarmament with a view to reporting on them to the States Parties
to the Treaty, and to the Security Council and the General Assembly
of the United Nations;
(e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on
an international basis so as to ensure the three principal groups
of States, existing in the world, are adequately represented. The
personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among those
persons who are recommended by the Governments and who may or may
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not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government;
(f) Prepare and submit to the Conference
the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization;
(g) Elaborate instructions by which the various
control elements must be guided in their work;
(h) Make timely analysis of incoming reports;
(i) Request from States such information on
their armed forces and. armaments as may be necessary for control
over the implementation of the disarmament measures, provided
for by the Treaty;
(j) Perform such other functions as are en
visaged in the present Treaty.
3. Each member of the Council shall have one vote.
Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by
a simple majority,
and on other matters by
a two-thirds
majority.
4.
The Council shall be so organized so
as tobe
able to function continuously. The Council shall adapt its own
rules of procedure
and shall be authorized
to establish
such
subsidary organs as it deems necessary for
the performance of
its functions.
Article 43- Privileges and immunities
Article 44- Finances
Article 45- Preparatory Commission
Part 6 .

Final Clauses
Article 46- Ratification and entry into force
Article 47- Amendments
Article 48- Authentic texts

**Draft treaty taken from:
UN Doc. DC/203, 5 June 1962 (ENDC/2, 19 March 1962), Appendix
c, pp. 115-131*
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